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Redefining the Boundary Between
Appropriation and Regulation
Jessica L. Asbridge*
The U.S. Supreme Court distinguishes between
appropriations and regulations of property rights when
interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. While
appropriations of any kind require just compensation to survive
constitutional scrutiny, whether non-appropriative laws
regulating property rights require compensation is determined on
an ad hoc basis, guided by concerns of fairness and justness. In
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,1 the Court reaffirmed its prior
precedent establishing the physical takings doctrine, providing
that an appropriation is any government action that results in a
physical invasion of an owner’s real property and a taking of the
owner’s right to exclude. The Court also set forth multiple
exceptions to the physical takings doctrine’s scope for certain
types of government invasions of property. The exceptions,
however, are ill-defined, and the Court failed to reconcile its
holding with its prior inconsistent decisions applying the
doctrine. Thus, the boundary between appropriation and
regulation remains murky, such that any heightened
constitutional protection for appropriative actions may be purely
illusory. Further, governments, courts, and property owners lack
clear guidance as to what laws are unconstitutional in the absence
of compensation.
Takings Clause scholars almost uniformly call for the
elimination of the Court’s physical takings doctrine. Critics of the
doctrine argue that any distinction between appropriations and
regulations should be eliminated, such that all government
actions short of formal acts of eminent domain should be evaluated
* Assistant Professor of Law, Baylor Law School. I am grateful for helpful comments
received and conversations about this project during the 2021 AALS New Voices in Property
Law: Junior Scholars Works-in-Progress Panel. I also am grateful to Carson Lacy and Cade
Palmer for excellent research assistance and to the staff of the BYU Law Review for
outstanding editorial work.
1. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).
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on a case-by-case basis, with compensation only justified where
the public interest is minimal or the economic hardship on the
owner is great. This approach, however, would only further
weaken the protection provided by the Takings Clause.
The physical takings doctrine is unsound, but contrary to the
dominant view in the scholarship, the Court’s distinction between
appropriations and regulations is not. The Court has long
recognized that appropriations require compensation without
regard to the public interest at play or fairness and justness
concerns, as shown by nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
cases overlooked or ignored by contemporary Takings Clause
scholars. Rather than defining appropriations as permanent,
physical invasions, however, these cases demonstrate that an
appropriation occurs when the government seeks to transfer the
right to use private property to a third party or the government
itself without a direct relationship to the owner’s ongoing use of
the property. Regulation, by contrast, involves the government
controlling or restricting an owner’s use of property. Redefining
the boundary consistent with this historical understanding would
bring much-needed doctrinal clarity to takings jurisprudence
and advance important normative considerations. Requiring
compensation for all properly defined appropriative acts furthers
multiple values including autonomy and political freedom and
accounts for the interests of owners and non-owners alike.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court has long distinguished between
appropriations and regulations of property in interpreting the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause.2 Compensation is required for any
law that appropriates property without regard to the particular
circumstances.3 By contrast, whether compensation is required for
non-appropriative laws that regulate private property rights is
determined by reference to a multifaceted, ad hoc inquiry, guided
by concerns of fairness and justness.4 Because of the radically
different treatment afforded an appropriative action, what
constitutes an appropriation as opposed to a mere regulation of
property rights is crucial to determining the constitutionality of a
given action.
In Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, the Court reaffirmed that the
physical takings doctrine controls what government action short of
formal exercises of eminent domain constitutes an appropriation of
real property.5 The doctrine establishes a bright-line rule providing
that an appropriation is any government action—even if garbed as
2. See, e.g., Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 351, 360–61 (2015) (recognizing
a distinction between government appropriation of property versus regulation of
property); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321–22
(2002) (same).
3. See Horne, 576 U.S. at 357–58 (“[A]n appropriation is a per se taking that requires
just compensation.”).
4. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978)
(recognizing that “the ‘Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole’” (alteration in original) (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960))).
5. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2072.
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a regulation or statute—that results in a physical invasion of an
owner’s real property and a taking of the owner’s right to exclude.6
The Court also eliminated the requirement that a physical invasion
must be permanent to constitute an appropriation and created a
series of exceptions from the doctrine’s application for certain types
of government access to property.7 The Court failed, however, to
clearly explain the scope of the exceptions or to reconcile its prior
inconsistent precedent with its holding.8 Thus, the boundary
between an appropriation and a regulation remains murky, such
that any heightened constitutional protection for appropriative
actions may be purely illusory. Further, governments, courts, and
property owners lack clear guidance as to what regulations are
unconstitutional in the absence of compensation.
The Court in Cedar Point claimed that its physical takings
jurisprudence is as “old as the Republic.”9 I argue that, although the
Court’s distinction between appropriations and regulations is
rooted in history, the Court’s equating of an appropriation with
a permanent, physical invasion is not. I thus seek to redefine
the boundary between appropriations and regulations and provide
a historically grounded “fresh look” as to the question of
constitutional protection of private property rights.10 I closely
analyze nineteenth- and early twentieth-century state and federal
cases involving the eminent domain power, including the cases
involving businesses affected with a public interest, which
have been overlooked (or ignored) in contemporary takings
scholarship.11 I also analyze various secondary sources from the
relevant periods in making my descriptive claims.12 Ultimately, I
conclude the Court distinguished between “regulations,” involving
6. Id. at 2072–73.
7. Id. at 2078–80.
8. Cf. David A. Dana & Nadav Shoked, Property’s Edges, 60 B.C. L. REV. 753, 758–59
(2019) (observing, prior to the Court’s decision in Cedar Point, that the Court has failed to
consistently apply the physical takings doctrine, such that it has “generat[ed] a seemingly
endless stream of contradictory decisions”).
9. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2071.
10. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1957 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In my
view, it would be desirable for us to take a fresh look at our regulatory takings jurisprudence,
to see whether it can be grounded in the original public meaning of the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment or the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
11. See infra Sections II.C, III.A–D.
12. See infra Section III.A.
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exercises of the police power, and “appropriations,” involving
exercises of the eminent domain power. Regulations were a
category of actions that restricted or controlled the owner’s use of
property, and a regulation’s validity was resolved through the
traditional substantive due process inquiry, which included
examining whether the law furthered the public welfare.
Appropriations were a separate category of government action
involving transfers of the right to use property to a third party or
the government. An action that constituted an appropriation
required compensation without regard to the public interest at play
or the economic impact of the appropriation on the owner.
As the facts of Cedar Point demonstrate, the boundary between
appropriation and regulation is not always readily apparent, as
government action can, at times, be said to simultaneously control
an owner’s use of property and seek to transfer the right to use
property to a third party or government itself. I thus advocate for a
nuanced approach, such that, even when government action
transfers the right to use property from one owner to another,
compensation is only required if no direct relationship between the
owner’s use of the property and the government use exists. Such an
approach is consistent with a historical understanding of the
Takings Clause, but at the same time does not unduly restrict the
government from being able to regulate in the public interest.
In making this argument, I reject the now dominant view in the
scholarship that whether compensation is required for government
action that infringes upon property rights is dependent on fairness
and justness concerns—not on whether an action is appropriative
or regulatory in nature.13
Multiple scholars have recently argued not only for the end of
the physical takings doctrine, but also for the end of any distinction
13. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Property-as-Society, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 911, 968, 970 (2018)
(arguing that the progressive view of “property-as-society” has “ascended to a position of
jurisprudential prominence” and that, under this approach, there is no bright-line test to
determine whether or not takings liability occurs, but rather such questions should be
resolved with reference to “moral and political judgment,” fairness, and justness); JENNIFER
NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE
MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 234–35 (1990) (arguing that the scholarship no
longer views the Takings Clause as a limit on governmental power, but rather is focused on
whether those whose property has been taken ought to be compensated); see also Henry A.
Span, Public Choice Theory and the Political Utility of the Takings Clause, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 11, 21
(2003) (the scholarship “almost uniformly attack[s] the Court’s use of bright-line rules in the
Takings Clause context”).

813

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:3 (2022)

between regulation and appropriation.14 Recognizing a clear
boundary between regulations and appropriations, however, not
only is historically justified, but also—as a normative matter—lessens
the likelihood of arbitrary governmental action and furthers
important values such as autonomy and political freedom. It also
recognizes the interests of owners and non-owners alike, generally
allowing for regulation, but requiring compensation for any
appropriations even if in the public interest. Concerns such as
fairness and justness, as well as whether the owner benefits from
the appropriation, can be addressed in calculating the
compensation due, as opposed to factoring these concerns into the
initial all-or-nothing decision as to whether a constitutional taking
has occurred.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the Court’s
decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,15
establishing the physical takings doctrine, and the Court’s recent
decision in Cedar Point embracing the doctrine. This Part also
explores scholarly criticism of the doctrine.
Part II examines evidence concerning the meaning of the
Takings Clause at the time of its drafting until shortly after the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the meaning
of the Takings Clause with respect to whether compensation was
required for regulations infringing upon property rights is unclear,

14. See Mulvaney, supra note 13, at 941 (arguing that “takings adjudications should be
concerned not with whether a state decision presses property into public service but rather
the extent to which it applies that pressure in a way that unfairly and unjustly isolates and
sacrifices an individual owner’s property interest”); Lynn E. Blais, The Total Takings Myth, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 47, 49–52 (2017) (arguing for the elimination of any bright-line rule
requiring compensation for appropriative acts and instead arguing all so-called regulatory
takings should be resolved by reference to a multifactor ad hoc balancing test); Lynda L.
Butler, The Horne Dilemma: Protecting Property’s Richness and Frontiers, 75 MD. L. REV. 787,
790 (2016) [hereinafter Butler, Horne Dilemma] (arguing that the Court’s per se approach in
Horne—focused solely on whether a direct appropriation occurred—fails to account for
“property’s ability to evolve and provide order for emerging resources and property
forms”); see also Lynda L. Butler, The Governance Function of Constitutional Property, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1687, 1709 (2015) [hereinafter Butler, The Governance Function] (arguing that the
physical takings doctrine as articulated in Loretto “ignores the complexity of physical
takings” that is present in the Court’s nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century cases);
Danaya C. Wright, A Requiem for Regulatory Takings: Reclaiming Eminent Domain for
Constitutional Property Claims, 49 ENV’T L. 307, 366 (2019) (arguing that the history of the
Takings Clause demonstrates the Court should consider the public interest in determining
whether just compensation must be paid for appropriative actions).
15. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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the evidence is largely consistent that compensation was required
for appropriative acts.
Part III examines the Supreme Court’s early cases protecting
property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, including those cases involving businesses affected with a
public interest. These cases demonstrate the Court has long
distinguished between regulations that control or restrict an
owner’s use of property and appropriations that seek to transfer the
right to use property from the owner to another. Appropriations
constituted exercises of the eminent domain power and always
required compensation without regard to the public interest at play
unlike regulations, which constituted exercises of the police power
and had to further the public welfare to be valid. Although private
property rights are now primarily protected under the Fifth
Amendment as incorporated against the states, these cases provide
important insight into what government acts require just
compensation today.
Finally, Part IV seeks to redefine the boundary between
appropriations and regulations based on a historical understanding
of constitutional protection of property rights. I also explore the
normative implications of my proposal and seek to address many
of the concerns raised in progressive property scholarship with
respect to the interests of non-owners and society as a whole.
I. THE COURT’S PHYSICAL TAKINGS DOCTRINE
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause provides “nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”16 It is generally settled that the provision requires
compensation for formal exercises of eminent domain—that is,
state seizures of property that result in the state assuming title to
the property for some “public use.”17 Whether it applies to
government regulatory action that takes private property rights
(such as the right to exclude), despite legal title to the property as a

16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081 (1993) (“The most historically
settled application of the Just Compensation Clause—indeed perhaps the only historically
settled application—is the requirement that government must pay for property it seizes
through an exercise of eminent domain.”).

815

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:3 (2022)

whole remaining with the owner, is subject to sharp disagreement
between both the Court’s justices and scholars.18
The Court set forth its modern regulatory takings doctrine in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,19 which
established an ad hoc balancing approach to regulatory takings.20
Shortly after Penn Central, the Court decided Loretto, where it
developed the physical takings doctrine, providing that
permanent, physical invasions constitute appropriations and thus
a per se taking requiring compensation without regard to the Penn
Central test.
Most recently, in Cedar Point, the Court reaffirmed Loretto and
the physical takings doctrine as an important part of the Court’s
takings jurisprudence. The boundary between appropriations
(requiring compensation as a rule) and regulations (subject to the
Penn Central test) remains unclear, however, as the Cedar Point
majority set forth multiple, vague exceptions to the physical takings
doctrine’s scope and failed to reconcile prior inconsistent
precedent.21 In light of the physical takings doctrine’s weaknesses,
multiple scholars have argued for the elimination of the physical
takings doctrine and application of the Penn Central ad hoc test (or
a version of it) to both appropriative and regulatory actions.
A. Loretto and the Origins of the Physical Takings Doctrine
Loretto concerned whether a New York law requiring a
landlord, Jean Loretto, to permit a cable television company to
install its cable facilities on her property violated the Takings
Clause.22 The Court concluded the law, which resulted in Loretto
being displaced from approximately 1½ cubic feet of her property,
18. See Mulvaney, supra note 13, at 917–53 (explaining the disagreement on the Court
and in the scholarship as between those who view property as liberty and argue for brightline rules and those who view property as society and urge balancing tests focused on the
public interest, fairness, and justness); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of
Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 586 n.281 (2005) (summarizing commentary on the Takings
Clause “muddle”).
19. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
20. Id. at 124. This test involves examining the following factors to determine whether
a taking has occurred: (1) ”[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant”; (2) ”the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations”;
and (3) ”the character of the governmental action.” Id.
21. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).
22. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
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resulted in a taking without just compensation.23 Rather than apply
the Penn Central balancing test it had recently adopted for
regulatory takings, the Court concluded the law was
unconstitutional without just compensation solely on the basis that
it constituted an appropriation, which it equated to a permanent,
physical occupation of property.24
The Court described an “appropriation” as “perhaps the most
serious form of invasion of an owner’s property interests.”25 The
New York law resulted in a “special kind of injury” because a
stranger had directly invaded and occupied the private property.26
Permanent physical occupations resulted in takings of the right to
exclude—”the most treasured strand[] in an owner’s bundle of
property rights”—as a taking of the right to exclude also destroyed
the owner’s rights to possess, use, and dispose of the occupied
property.27 Accordingly, the Court found irrelevant the economic
impact of the law on Loretto and the public interest at issue, which
the state court had described as involving the interests of tenants
and “encourag[ing] development” of cable television, “an
important educational and communications medium.”28
In creating the bright-line rule that a permanent, physical
invasion constituted a per se Fifth Amendment violation, the Court
relied heavily on its nineteenth- and early twentieth-century cases
involving permanent invasions of property. The Court first cited to
one of its oldest takings cases, Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., which
interpreted a provision of the Wisconsin Constitution identical to
the Takings Clause and held that the permanent flooding of the
plaintiff’s property due to the defendant’s construction of a dam,
pursuant to state authority, constituted a taking.29 The Loretto Court
determined that the flooding had constituted a taking because it
resulted in “a physical invasion of the real estate of the private
owner, and a practical ouster of his possession.”30 The Court
concluded that the size of the invasion was irrelevant, noting that
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 434–35, 438 n.16.
Id.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 435, 444.
Id. at 427 (citing Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1872)).
Id. at 428.
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its prior cases demonstrated that permanent installations of
telegraph and telephone lines, rails, and underground pipes and
wires all constituted compensable takings, despite occupying
insubstantial amounts of space and not seriously interfering with
the landowner’s use of the rest of his land.31
The Court observed that its prior cases suggested that more
temporary invasions, such as in the case of temporary flooding, did
not give rise to a taking because they “only impaired the use of
plaintiffs’ property.”32 The Court took care to classify as temporary
the invasion at issue in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, a case
which the Court had decided only two years prior to Loretto.33 In
PruneYard, the Court had upheld California’s state constitutional
requirement that shopping center owners must permit individuals
to exercise free speech and petition rights on property to which the
owners had invited the general public.34 The Loretto Court found
the invasion caused by the California constitutional requirement to
be temporary and limited in nature, observing that owners could
restrict expressive activities by imposing reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions to minimize interference with the owners’
commercial functions.35 “Since the invasion [at issue in PruneYard]
was temporary and limited in nature, and since the owner had not
exhibited an interest in excluding all persons from his property, ‘the
fact that the solicitors may have physically invaded the owners’
property [was not] . . . determinative.’”36
The Loretto Court defended the bright-line rule it established as
avoiding “difficult line-drawing problems” and presenting
relatively “few problems of proof,” as the rule was not dependent
on the size of the invasion and the placement of a fixed structure
would generally not be subject to dispute.37 The Court stressed that
its holding was “narrow” and in no way interfered with a state’s
broad power to impose appropriate restrictions upon an owner’s
use of his property.38 Thus, following Loretto, the Court’s
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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Id. at 430.
Id. at 427–28.
Id. at 434 (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82–85 (1980)).
PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82–85.
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434.
Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 436–37.
Id. at 441.
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jurisprudence appeared to be that whether a law resulted in an
appropriation requiring compensation could be resolved by
determining whether the law caused a permanent, physical
invasion and without resort to the Penn Central test.
B. Cedar Point and the Failures of the Physical Takings Doctrine
In June 2021, the Court in Cedar Point revisited Loretto in
deciding an as-applied challenge of two nurseries to the validity of
a labor regulation promulgated by the California Agricultural
Labor Relations Board (“the Board”).39 The regulation provided
nonemployee union organizers with access to employers’ private
property for labor organizing purposes.40 The Court held that the
regulation was unconstitutional in the absence of compensation
because it effectuated a per se taking under the physical takings
doctrine set forth in Loretto.41 In the course of its decision, the Court
modified the physical takings doctrine by eliminating the
permanence requirement set forth in Loretto and by setting forth a
series of exceptions to the doctrine’s scope.42
The decision may very well signal the beginning of a new
willingness by the Court to interpret the Takings Clause’s
protections expansively.43 Yet the Court failed to explain its prior
39. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2069 (2021).
40. Id. The regulation at issue was upheld in 1976 by the California Supreme Court
who rejected the Takings Clause challenge made by multiple farms because of the weighty
governmental policy in favor of collective bargaining. Agric. Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Superior Ct.,
546 P.2d 687, 693–94 (Cal. 1976). The U.S. Supreme Court initially agreed to review of the
case, but later dismissed it for lack of a substantial federal question. Kubo v. Agric. Lab. Rels.
Bd., 429 U.S. 802 (1976). The Court’s dismissal occurred prior to both Penn Central and Loretto.
Prior to Cedar Point, the consensus by scholars was that laws like California’s access
regulation were constitutional, as they did not satisfy the permanence requirement under
Loretto to bring them within the scope of the physical takings doctrine. See Cynthia L.
Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305, 353–55 &
nn.265–68 (1994); Nathan S. Newman, The Legal Foundations for State Laws Granting Labor
Unions Access to Employer Property, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 689, 708–25 (2014).
41. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2080.
42. Id. at 2074, 2078–80.
43. See Hugh Hewitt, Opinion: The Supreme Court Is Heading Back to Philadelphia, WASH.
POST (July 6, 2021, 2:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/07/06/
supreme-court-has-taken-gentle-decisive-curve-right/ (“The new court also made clear it
will protect property rights in its June holding in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, obliging
governments to pay for all property they seize, a long overdue reemphasis on a weightbearing wall of freedom.”); see also Ilya Somin, Supreme Court’s Cedar Point Property Rights
Decision Protects Both Sides, HILL (June 23, 2021, 7:30 PM), https://thehill.com/
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inconsistent treatment of takings of the right to exclude. Further, in
creating a new framework, the Court likely created more questions
than it answered.44 Thus, although hailed by some as a victory for
constitutional protection of private property rights,45 it may serve
to weaken them, as it has injected further uncertainty into the scope
of the physical takings doctrine—and thus the Takings Clause
itself. This impacts governments, courts, and property owners, as
what actions involving physical invasions require compensation
remains unsettled.
1. Invasions of property and the right to exclude
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Cedar Point majority,
held that the access regulation constituted a per se physical
taking because it had “appropriate[d] for the enjoyment of third
parties the owners’ right to exclude” and resulted in a physical
invasion.46 The majority stressed the “central importance to
property ownership of the right to exclude” and that safeguarding
this right helped to “preserve individual liberty.”47 Thus, the Court
fully embraced the language in Loretto regarding the importance of
the right to exclude and that a taking of this right constitutes

opinion/judiciary/559914-supreme-courts-cedar-point-property-rights-decision-protectsboth-sides?rl=1 (arguing that the majority interpreted the Takings Clause more robustly than
was even required under the circumstances, as the Court could have held simply that “an
occupation need not be literally continuous in order to be permanent[,]” but instead went
one step further by crafting the general rule that “a physical appropriation is a taking
whether it is permanent or temporary”).
44. Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114
YALE L.J. 203, 248 (2004) (referring to the physical takings doctrine as the “most problematic”
of the Court’s categorical rules); Mark Kelman, Untangling Horne; Resuscitating Nollan, 104
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 50, 56 (2018); Dana & Shoked, supra note 8, at 759 (noting the
criticism of the physical takings doctrine as “incoherent” as the Court has failed to abide by
the rule it announced, such that Loretto has “generat[ed] a seemingly endless stream of
contradictory decisions”).
45. See, e.g., Amy Howe, Court Holds that Regulation Guaranteeing Union Access
to Employees Is Unconstitutional, SCOTUSBLOG (June 23, 2021, 3:01 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/06/court-holds-that-regulation-guaranteeing-unionaccess-to-employees-is-unconstitutional/ (“The ruling was a major victory for propertyrights advocates and a setback for unions.”); Editorial, Big Win for Property Rights, WALL ST.
J. (June 23, 2021, 6:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-win-for-property-rights11624486919 (“[T]he Court’s 6-3 Cedar Point Nursery decision . . . significantly bolsters
protections of private property rights.”).
46. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2072.
47. Id. at 2073, 2078.
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an appropriation.48 A significant body of scholarship, led by
influential scholars including Thomas Merrill, Henry Smith, and
Richard Epstein, defends the right to exclude as fundamental to the
concept of property as a matter of theory and thus provides support
for the Court’s approach.49
Yet the Court has still failed to persuasively explain why it
values takings of the right to exclude, which may have little
economic impact on an owner, so highly above takings of the right
to use property, which often have significant economic impact.50
Further, the Court does not consistently require compensation for
a taking of the right to exclude, as it has often prized non-owners’

48. Many of the Court’s prior decisions have highlighted the importance of the right
to exclude in the proverbial bundle of sticks, recognizing it as “one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of [property] rights.” See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176
(1979); see David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others from Private
Property: A Fundamental Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 41–44 (2000)
(summarizing Supreme Court decisions to argue that the right to exclude is a fundamental
right); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 1102–03 (1993) (“If English contained the word,
we might say that Loretto introduced into takings doctrine the idea of rights of
‘propertyhood’—the idea that some incidents of ownership are so central to a person’s ability
to define property as his own that they cannot be eliminated without transgressing
constitutional norms.”).
49. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v.
Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 36–40 (1997) (arguing that all takings of the right to exclude
should require compensation); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude,
77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 754–55 (1998) (arguing that property means the right to exclude others
from valued resources—“no more and no less”); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus
Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002). Merrill
and Smith do not understand the right to exclude to have value in its own right, but rather
it is “an important organizing principle that enables parties to economize on information and
transaction costs.” Jonathan Klick & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of the Right to Exclude:
An Empirical Assessment, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 921 (2017).
50. In Loretto, Justice Blackmun also dissented from application of the per se rule
because its ability “to distinguish, even crudely, between significant and insignificant losses
is too puny to be taken seriously.” Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 447 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165, 1227 (1967)). On remand in Loretto, the Court awarded only nominal damages for the
installation of the cable, as the installation likely increased the value of the property rather
than decreased it. See Joseph William Singer, Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 601, 643 (2015). By contrast, in cases such as Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538–
39 (1992), where the property owner suffered great economic loss due to the rent control
provisions, the physical takings doctrine does not apply, as the Court has found that such
provisions regulate use and do not constitute physical invasions and are otherwise valid
under Penn Central.
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rights above private property owners’ rights, especially in the labor
organizing context.
For example, in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., the Court ruled
that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) required employers
to allow nonemployee union organizers access to the employer’s
property in limited circumstances.51 Specifically, nonemployee
union organizers could access the employer’s property to meet
with employees who lived on company property if organizers had
no other reasonable means to communicate with the employees.52
Thus, the Court held that employees’ rights under the NLRA could
outweigh employers’ property rights—despite the fact that the
NLRA would literally take the employer’s right to exclude third
party strangers and result in a physical invasion.53 In Lechmere, Inc.
v. NLRB, a decision issued almost four decades later and after the
Court’s establishment of the physical takings doctrine in Loretto, the
Court reaffirmed the rule announced in Babcock.54
The Cedar Point Court curtly dismissed Babcock as having no
bearing on the constitutionality of the California access regulation
because Babcock did not address any constitutional takings claim,
but instead involved an issue of statutory interpretation of the
NLRA.55 It also did not address its prior precedent holding that the
NLRA requires employers to allow employees (who do not live on
an employer’s property) to organize on an employer’s private
property during non-working hours, despite such access also
involving a physical invasion and an infringement on the right to
exclude.56 Thus, labor access previously thought to be permitted by
the NLRA or other state laws may be subject to constitutional
challenge following Cedar Point, as the Court left unresolved the
impact Cedar Point has on such access.57 Relatedly, the impact Cedar
51. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 111–12 (1956).
52. Id. at 113.
53. Id. at 112.
54. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
55. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2077 (2021).
56. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 558, 575–76 (1978) (holding that, under the
NLRA, employers could not bar employees from distributing union materials relating to
political matters during nonworking hours).
57. See Jeffrey Berman, Nick Geannacopulos, Timothy Hoppe & David Wilson,
In Cedar Point Nursery, the United States Supreme Court Strikes Down Restriction on the
Right to Exclude Union Organizers from Private Property, JD SUPRA (June 30, 2021),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/in-cedar-point-nursery-the-united-5807916/ (“The
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Point has on various employment laws that impact an employer’s
right to exclude (such as laws requiring employers to provide a
place for breastfeeding mothers to express breast milk) also
remains unclear.
Additionally, the Cedar Point majority’s efforts to distinguish
PruneYard were unpersuasive. In PruneYard, the Court held that a
provision requiring an owner of commercial property to allow
access for solicitation purposes did not violate the Takings Clause
despite a literal taking of the right to exclude.58 Because the Cedar
Point majority eliminated the permanence requirement as part of
the physical takings doctrine, it could not rely on the invasion at
issue in PruneYard being temporary as the reason it did not
constitute a taking (as it had in Loretto). Thus, the Cedar Point
majority ruled PruneYard did not control because the PruneYard
owner had opened the property to the public whereas the Cedar
Point nurseries had not (although they had opened their property
to the farm workers).59 Whether an owner invites the general public
onto his or her property is irrelevant to why the right to exclude
would be constitutionally protected in one setting and not another
case, while focused on private property not opened to the public, could provide employers
a tool to limit labor access to other types of private property as well.”) (emphasis omitted);
All Things Considered, SCOTUS: Union Organizers Cannot Access California Farms, NPR (June
23, 2021, 4:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/06/23/1009582184/scotus-unionorganizers-cannot-access-california-farms (arguing that Cedar Point will be used by
employers in the future to challenge all manner of union activity); Ronald Meisburg & Ryan
J. Evans, The Cedar Point Decision: A Victory for Employer Property Rights, HUNTON ANDREWS
KURTH: HUNTON EMP. & LAB. PERSPS. (July 1, 2021), https://www.huntonlaborblog.com/
2021/07/articles/supreme-court-cases/the-cedar-point-decision-a-victory-for-employerproperty-rights/ (recognizing that the implications of Cedar Point on NLRA precedent
involving off-duty employee access remains unclear). By contrast, some have argued that
the impact of Cedar Point will be limited, as the ruling currently applies only to employers
in one industry in one state and union organizers in California have rarely invoked
their right to access the properties. See Mark Theodore, Joshua Fox & Ross Evans, Access
Denied: Supreme Court Finds California Regulation Permitting Union Access to Employer Property
Constitutes an Unconstitutional Taking, PROSKAUER: LAB. RELS. UPDATE (July 1, 2021),
https://www.laborrelationsupdate.com/uncategorized/access-denied-supreme-courtfinds-california-regulation-permitting-union-access-to-employer-property-constitutes-anunconstitutional-taking; see also Michael Hayes, Unions Have Right of Access for NLRA
Employees After SCOTUS Ruling, BLOOMBERG L. (July 20, 2021, 2:00 AM)
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/class-action/unions-have-right-of-access-for-nlra-employeesafter-scotus-ruling-18 (“However, based on language in the majority opinion by Chief Justice
John Roberts, it seems unlikely that the decision can or should reduce any rights of
employees who are protected by the NLRA . . . .”).
58. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82–85 (1980).
59. See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2076–77.
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setting and ignores that the PruneYard owner had invited the
public onto the property only to browse and shop—not to engage
in solicitation.60
Finally, laws barring owners from denying access to public
accommodations on the basis of race or other protected
characteristics result in a taking of the right to exclude.61 The Court
upheld these laws in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States.62
This is without a doubt the correct result, and the Court certainly
has no intention of overturning this case.63 Nevertheless, Heart
of Atlanta Motel demonstrates that a taking of the right to exclude
by itself is not the determining factor as to whether a constitutional
violation occurs, but yet the Cedar Point Court made no attempt
to explain what other factor plays a role.64 The confusion over
whether some property rights are fundamental thus remains an
open question.65
2. Exceptions to the physical takings doctrine
Central to the holding in Cedar Point was the determination that
a physical invasion need not be “permanent” to qualify for per se
treatment under the physical takings doctrine.66 Specifically, the
60. See Gregory C. Sisk, Returning to the PruneYard: The Unconstitutionality of StateSanctioned Trespass in the Name of Speech, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 389, 411 (2009).
61. Some have argued that the opinion may result in future challenges to civil rights
laws. See Elie Mystal, Yesterday’s Union-Busting Supreme Court Decision Was a Segregationist
Throwback, NATION (June 24, 2021), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/cedarpoint-court/ (arguing that Cedar Point reinvigorates arguments that may allow property
owners to deny civil rights); All Things Considered, supra note 57, at 03:15 (“So union
organizers are just one very small group of unwanted people that property owners may want
to keep off of their land. Store—racially discriminatory storefront owners—right?—have
long wanted to exclude people of color from their land. We know about stores that may want
to exclude LGBTQ persons from their storefronts.”).
62. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
63. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 529 (1992) (referencing Heart of Atlanta
Motel).
64. See generally Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. 2063; cf. Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of
Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1481 (1991) (arguing that, in Loretto, the Court failed to
explain “why physicalism should be basic to property law,” as the Court does not require a
physical invasion as being required for a violation of the Takings Clause).
65. Wright, supra note 14, at 354–55 (“Whether property rights are creatures of state
law, subject to being defined and redefined at will, or whether there is some core set of
principles protecting property that cannot be infringed is a question that has plagued judges,
philosophers, and political writers for centuries.”).
66. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2074–75. Scholars had criticized the permanence
requirement as confounding. See Blais, supra note 14, at 51; see also Lynda L. Butler, Murr v.
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access regulation at issue limited the organizers’ access to the
nurseries’ property to 120 days per year and to certain times of
day.67 This had led the Ninth Circuit to conclude the regulation was
subject to the Penn Central balancing test, as only regulations that
“allow for permanent and continuous access ‘24 hours a day, 365 days
a year’” could qualify as per se takings.68 The Cedar Point majority
rejected such “absolutist” reasoning, despite its earlier focus in
Loretto on the importance of the permanence of the physical invasion
to whether a government action constitutes a per se taking.69
The Court softened its elimination of the permanence
requirement by setting forth three categories of government actions
that would not qualify as per se physical takings.70 First,
trespasses—isolated physical invasions—did not constitute takings
and the remedy for such trespasses was to be found in tort law.71
Second, physical invasions “consistent with longstanding
background restrictions on property rights” and “traditional
common law privileges to access private property” also did
not constitute per se physical takings.72 Finally, the government
could still require property owners to cede a right of access as

Wisconsin and the Inherent Limits of Regulatory Takings, 47 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 139 (2019);
Butler, The Governance Function, supra note 14, at 1760–62 (analyzing the Court’s physical
takings cases and concluding that the degree of physicality and permanence of an invasion
did not correlate to whether a taking was found). The permanence requirement, in some
respects, “‘reduce[d] the constitutional issue to a formalistic quibble’ over whether property
has been ‘permanently occupied’ or ‘temporarily invaded.’” See Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 442 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Joseph
L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964)).
67. The regulation at issue, promulgated under the California Agricultural Labor
Relations Act, provides that (1) two organizers for every 15 employees may enter the
employer’s property; (2) the property is available to any one union for up to 120 days a year
(four 30-day periods); (3) organizers could enter the property for one hour before the start of
work and one hour after the completion of work to meet and talk with employees in areas
where they congregate before and after working; and (4) the organizers could enter the
employer’s property for an hour during the working day to talk with employees during their
lunch period at areas where they eat lunch. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 20900(e)(4) (2021).
68. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2074 (emphasis added) (quoting Cedar Point Nursery v.
Shiroma, 923 F.3d 524, 532 (9th Cir. 2019)).
69. Id. at 2075.
70. Id. at 2078–80.
71. Id. at 2078.
72. Id. at 2079 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028–29 (1992)
(explaining that “the government does not take a property interest when it merely asserts a
‘pre-existing limitation upon the land owner’s title’”)).
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a condition of receiving certain benefits without causing a taking in
limited circumstances.73
The scope of these exceptions, however, remains unclear
following Cedar Point.74 Indeed, in dissent, Justice Breyer stated his
belief that the Court had not “made matters clearer or better,” but
rather had adopted a “new broad rule and indeterminate
exceptions.”75 With respect to the first exception relating to
“isolated” physical invasions and trespasses, it is unclear as to what
will be considered “isolated” and how, exactly, “isolated” differs
from a “temporary” invasion.76 In highlighting the difficulties with
defining “isolated,” the dissent gave the following example:
And where should one draw the line between trespass and
takings? Imagine a school bus that stops to allow public school
children to picnic on private land. Do three stops a year place the
stops outside the exception? One stop every week? Buses from
one school? From every school? Under current law a court would
know what question to ask. The stops are temporary; no one
assumes a permanent right to stop; thus the court will ask whether
the school district has gone “too far.”77

The scope of the second exception concerning “traditional
common law privileges to access property” is also far from selfexplanatory.78 It is unclear what privileges fall into this category,
including (1) whether only those exceptions that existed as of a
certain date should count (and, if so, what date); (2) whether courts
should apply the privileges as they existed at that date; and
(3) whether the court should update certain exceptions in light of
current circumstances, and, if so, which ones.79 For example,
although the majority stated that “no traditional background
principle of property law requires the growers to admit union
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2078–80.
75. Id. at 2089 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2078 (majority opinion).
77. Id. at 2088 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 2079 (majority opinion).
79. Id. at 2088–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority stated that this exception would
encompass “public or private necessity,” the enforcement of criminal law “under certain
circumstances,” and reasonable searches. Id. at 2079 (majority opinion). This explanation
still leaves open multiple questions. For example, the dissent questioned whether a
necessity exception to access property existed for preserving animal habitats. Id. at 2088–89
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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organizers onto their premises,” California labor law has provided
for temporary access for organizing purposes since 1975, raising the
question of when an exception becomes rooted in a traditional
principle of property law.80 Further, the Court noted in its opinion
that, “[a]s a general matter, it is true that the property rights
protected by the Takings Clause are creatures of state law.”81 Thus,
this exception implicates the question of the interaction between
state property law and federal constitutional law. States may vary
in the types and the scope of common law privileges to access
property they recognize, resulting in constitutional protection of
property rights varying between states.
Finally, the third exception from the physical takings doctrine
allows government to “require property owners to cede a right of
access as a condition of receiving certain benefits[] without causing
a taking” provided that the “condition bears an ‘essential nexus’
and ‘rough proportionality’ to the impact of the proposed use of the
property.”82 The majority explained that government health and
safety inspection regimes would generally not constitute
unconstitutional takings in light of the exception.83 However, the
Court held that “unlike standard health and safety inspections, the
access regulation is not germane to any benefit provided to
agricultural employers or any risk posed to the public.”84
The dissent, by contrast, argued that labor peace could arguably
constitute a “benefit” achieved by the access regulation, such that
the regulation fell within the exception.85 As the majority did not
clearly delineate the scope of this exception, it remains unclear,
bringing into doubt numerous regulatory schemes that are
dependent upon temporary government access to private property.86

80. Id. at 2080 (majority opinion); id. at 2088–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 2075–76 (majority opinion).
82. Id. at 2079.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2080.
85. Id. at 2089 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86. See Wayne D’Angelo & Jordan Rodriguez, Supreme Court Decision in Cedar
Point Nursery v. Hassid May Provide Businesses New Opportunity to Challenge Regulations, JD
SUPRA (July 7, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/supreme-court-decision-incedar-point-4375087/ (“The Court’s holding that some temporary physical invasions are per
se takings could make it easier for businesses to challenge other regulations that give the
government or others access to private property.”).
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Prior to Cedar Point, one scholar described the physical takings
doctrine as a “blurry standard[] lacking analytic rigor and
theoretical content,” and that “fixing the boundaries of these
purported bright-line rules” has become “the focus of regulatory
takings claims.”87 Following Cedar Point, uncertainty and confusion
over the scope of the three exceptions to the doctrine is likely to
become the focus of physical takings claims.
C. Proposals for Change
Prior to Cedar Point, in light of the failures of the physical
takings doctrine, scholars almost uniformly called for the doctrine’s
replacement with an analysis that treats both physical and
regulatory actions infringing upon property rights alike and gives
no weight to a taking of the right to exclude. The decision in Cedar
Point, introducing additional uncertainty as to the scope of the
doctrine, is likely to lead to even more fervent criticism of the doctrine.
Progressive property scholars argue that the ad hoc balancing
test set forth in Penn Central or a redefined version of it focused on
the public interest should apply to both physical and regulatory
takings.88 Eric Claeys, a classical liberal scholar, agrees that the
physical-regulatory distinction should be eliminated, but
advocates for an ad hoc analysis that would provide heightened
protection to private property rights.89 By applying an ad hoc
approach across the board to all actions that do not formally divest
the owner of property through eminent domain, these scholars also
are arguing for the elimination of the Court’s current distinction
between regulations and appropriations.
Progressive property theory rests on the idea that property
“implicates plural and incommensurable values,” including
individual and societal values that often conflict.90 Further,

87. Blais, supra note 14, at 59, 82.
88. See Mulvaney, supra note 13, at 913–14; Blais, supra note 14, at 52–53; Butler,
Governance Function, supra note 14, at 1694–95; Wright, supra note 14, at 311; see also Andrea
L. Peterson, The False Dichotomy Between Physical and Regulatory Takings Analysis: A Critique
of Tahoe-Sierra’s Distinction Between Physical and Regulatory Takings, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 381,
384 (2007).
89. See Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1549, 1556–58 (2003).
90. Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S.
Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743 (2009).
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“[c]hoices about property entitlements are unavoidable,” but
nevertheless allocation of property rights can occur through
“reasoned deliberation” that draws upon “critical judgment,
tradition, experience, and discernment.”91 Progressive property
scholars generally construe the protection provided by the Takings
Clause narrowly, arguing that advancing the private property
owner’s interests often comes at the expense of the public’s interests
as a whole. In line with this understanding of property’s allocative
nature, progressive scholars generally agree that government
action infringing upon property rights is permissible in the absence
of compensation so long as the action is in the public interest and is
otherwise “fair and just.”
For example, Timothy Mulvaney contends that takings
adjudications should not be concerned with “whether a state
decision presses property into public service,” as property was
designed to serve the public.92 Rather, the Court should consider
“the extent to which it applies that pressure in a way that unfairly
and unjustly isolates and sacrifices an individual owner’s property
interest.”93 Under such an approach, “someone will win and
someone will lose when the state, as it must, makes such
decisions.”94 Nevertheless, “[i]n light of property’s allocative
nature, asking someone to comply with generally-applicable laws
designed to promote the public interest through reallocating the
benefits and burdens of property ownership ordinarily should not
require compensation.”95 Mulvaney explains:
In a democratic system, the institution of property usually can
demand only that the loser be offered a justification that, however
hard to swallow, should be accepted without such payment by
reasonable persons in her shoes under the circumstances. Only
when no such justification is available is affording takings
compensation to an individual property owner who has been
singled out appropriate.96

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 744.
Mulvaney, supra note 13, at 940–41.
Id. at 941.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Lynn Blais similarly argues that direct appropriations should
not be the focus of takings adjudications.97 She argues that only formal
exercises of eminent domain require compensation per se without
consideration of other factors.98 For all other categories of
government action, an ad hoc inquiry (such as Penn Central or a
redefined version of it) centered on concerns of fairness and
justness should instead apply.99 In making this argument, she
contends that, from a historical perspective, “the story of bright-line
rules and the total takings doctrine is relatively succinct and
straightforward,” and the Court lacks a historical basis for applying
bright-line rules in the takings context.100
Lynda Butler agrees with Blais that, historically, the Takings
Clause has not been interpreted as establishing bright-line rules.101
Instead, she argues that the Court’s nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century cases demonstrate that the Takings Clause
should be interpreted as establishing flexible rules that account for
the ever-evolving nature of property.102 She urges the Court to
replace Loretto with a framework that allows courts to account for
the “complexity of the entire property arrangement,” including the
interests of both owner and non-owners.103 She suggests that, in
evaluating takings claims, courts should account for the severity of
the invasion and consider the public interests at play.104
Danaya Wright also argues that the public interest must be
considered in determining whether compensation is required for

97. See Blais, supra note 14, at 82–85.
98. Id. at 83–84.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 53–54.
101. Butler, The Governance Function, supra note 14, at 1709 (arguing that the physical
takings doctrine as articulated in Loretto “ignores the complexity of physical takings” and
“fails to understand the reach of the management role of property,” which has caused the
Court to retreat in part from the per se approach).
102. Id. at 1722–23.
103. Id. at 1693, 1765.
104. Id. at 1725, 1733–34, 1740, 1768; see Butler, Horne Dilemma, supra note 14, at 787–88
(arguing that the Court’s per se approach in Horne—focused solely on whether a direct
appropriation occurred—fails to account for “property’s ability to evolve and provide
order for emerging resources and new forms of property” and urging adoption of a
governance approach).
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actions infringing upon private property rights.105 She relies heavily
on early state and federal cases addressing the Takings Clause, as
well as her interpretations of passages of an early twentieth-century
treatise.106 She asserts that “the public purpose of government
action is a valid factor in any compensation analysis,” and the public
interest was always considered in the Court’s pre-Loretto cases.107
In contrast to the above, Claeys argues for heightened
protection of property rights. Contrary to the Cedar Point majority’s
holding that a taking of the right to exclude necessarily gives rise
to a compensable taking,108 Claeys rejects any bright-line rules in
favor of ad hoc inquiries.109 Citing early state and federal cases,
Claeys argues that all government action infringing upon property
rights, even actions like that at issue in Loretto, should be resolved
by examining whether the government inflicted a disproportionate
burden on the property owner.110 This involves an inquiry into
whether the government action benefitted the property owner and
whether the owner was engaged in a harmful use of her property.111
Claeys thus rejects determining whether compensation is
warranted with regard to whether the action appropriated
property.112 He argues that elevating bright-line rules over
standards falls short and that general guiding principles, liberally
construed to protect private property, should apply instead.113
The physical takings doctrine stands in stark contrast to the
current scholarship arguing for the adoption of flexible, ad hoc
standards to evaluate whether compensation is required. Yet
Loretto and its progeny, as well as the scholarship arguing for the
rejection of Loretto, purport to rest on a historical understanding of
the Takings Clause. Thus, the question arises—does history
support the existence of any bright-line rules in the Takings Clause
context? The next two Parts delve into the history of constitutional
105. Wright, supra note 14, at 345–46. Wright also argues that courts should consider
whether the government action benefits the property owner—a reciprocity of advantage
analysis. Id. at 354.
106. Id. at 347.
107. Id. at 366.
108. See Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2072–74 (2021).
109. Claeys, supra note 89, at 1574, 1650–51.
110. Id. at 1648–52.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1556.
113. See id. at 1557–58.
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protection of private property rights and conclude that, although
“appropriations” have always required compensation to survive
constitutional scrutiny, the task of determining what constitutes an
appropriation is not dependent on whether a physical invasion
occurred. Rather, what constitutes an appropriation concerns whether
the right to use property was transferred to the government or a
third party and the relationship between the owner’s use and the
government use.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT’S TAKINGS CLAUSE
This Part examines the history of the Takings Clause from the
time of its drafting to shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratification. The scholarship on the original understanding of the
Takings Clause with respect to regulatory takings is voluminous
and often contradictory. With this in mind, I focus only on whether
the current predominant view in the scholarship is correct: that
whether compensation is required for a government action
infringing upon property rights (outside formal acts of eminent
domain) has historically been determined by way of ad hoc
inquiries, focused on the public interest and fairness and justness
factors.114 The evidence on this narrow issue is, in some respects,
sparse. Few court cases addressed the Takings Clause during this
time period, as it did not apply to the states. In other respects, the
writings of James Madison, not just on property, but also on
government more generally, strongly suggest that acts of
appropriation require compensation as a rule.
A. The Fifth Amendment at the Time of Ratification
Scholars sharply disagree as to the original intent and meaning
of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause as it concerns

114. This Article recognizes the distinction between “original intention” studies, which
study how the drafters intended the clause to apply, versus “original meaning” studies
concentrating on using historical sources to determine the objective meaning of a clause’s
terms. See id. at 1563–64. I draw on both approaches in analyzing the Takings Clause, but do
not seek to weigh in on the debate between which approach is preferable. See id.
(summarizing the debate between different approaches). Similar to Eric Claeys’s historical
examination of the Takings Clause, I refer to “originalism” “roughly to classify several
different approaches to studying historical sources” and do not clearly differentiate between
approaches throughout, in light of this. Id.
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government action regulating property use.115 However, the
evidence is considerably clearer that the Fifth Amendment required
compensation for all government action that appropriated property
by imposing a state-dictated use on property, regardless of the
public interest at stake or economic impact on the owner.
Much of the inquiry as to original intent turns on Madison’s
notions of property, as he alone drafted it, and it was ratified
without substantive discussion.116 Madison’s views, however, are
more complex than often noted in the scholarship, as they likely
incorporated aspects of both classical liberalism and civic
republicanism.117 Civic republicans’ primary concern centered on
collective self-governance with a focus on civic virtue and sacrifice
for the good of the whole.118 Civic republicanism looked with
skepticism on constitutional limitations on majoritarian
government, unlike classical liberals whose primary concerns
related to negative liberty and individual rights.119 Civic
republicans’ and classical liberals’ views on property also diverged.
Civic republicans held a “profoundly ambivalent stance toward
private property,” as they saw private property as a potential
source of corruption, but also as providing the individual with the
115. Compare John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of
the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1101 (2000) [hereinafter Hart, Early Republic Land
Use Law] (arguing that the Takings Clause was originally understood as referring only to
appropriation, as demonstrated by numerous land use regulations in effect at the time of the
drafting of the Takings Clause that were not impacted by the provision), John F. Hart,
Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252,
1253 (1996) [hereinafter Hart, Colonial Land Use Law] (arguing that pervasive colonial land
use regulation demonstrates the Takings Clause did not apply to regulatory takings),
Bernard Schwartz, Takings Clause—”Poor Relation” No More?, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 417, 420 (1994)
(arguing that the Takings Clause was only intended to cover direct and physical takings
based on Madison’s intent), and William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the
Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 783 (1995) (“While the evidence
of original intent is limited, it clearly indicates that the Takings Clause was intended to apply
only to physical takings . . . .”), with Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent:
The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis “Goes Too Far”, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181, 182, 185 (1999)
(arguing that the historical evidence is mixed as to whether the Takings Clause required
compensation for regulatory takings), Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings:
Setting the Record Straight, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1211, 1215 (1996) (same), and David A. Thomas,
Finding More Pieces for the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting History Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U.
COLO. L. REV. 497, 540–41 (2004) (same).
116. See Treanor, supra note 115, at 835–36; Thomas, supra note 115, at 542.
117. See Treanor, supra note 115, at 826 n.226.
118. Span, supra note 13, at 61.
119. Id.; see Treanor, supra note 115, at 820–21.
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autonomy necessary to fully participate in the political process.120
Classical liberals, by contrast, viewed strong protections for private
property rights as enhancing individual liberty.121
The Takings Clause can be seen, in some ways, as a compromise
between these two traditions.122 As the plain language of the
provision reflects, property rights were not treated as inviolable,
unlike other constitutional rights. Government could take
property—put property to public use—if it paid just compensation.
What government action constituted a taking requiring
compensation must be interpreted in light of Madison’s concern
about protecting minorities from factions, expressed throughout
his writings. The preservation of the republic, to him, depended in
large part on reducing the threat that factions posed.123 Madison
was not just concerned with factions based on “different degrees
and kinds of property,” but also other factions arising from a “zeal
for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government,
and many other points,” including preferences for different
political leaders.124 Madison’s concern was that those factions who
believed they were acting for the common good would believe they
were justified in the oppression of minorities.125
Madison thus was not concerned primarily with a selfinterested government that would act contrary to the interests of
the public as a whole, but rather was concerned about the
majority—even when acting pursuant to legitimate governmental
mechanisms and acting in what is believed to be in the public
120. Treanor, supra note 115, at 821.
121. Span, supra note 13, at 61 & n.221. Viewing these two schools of thought on
opposite ends of a spectrum, however, oversimplifies the matter. During the founding era,
politicians’ views, including Madison’s, often “reflected the influence of both schools of
thought.” See Treanor, supra note 115, at 826 n.226. Further, although classical liberal theories
are often viewed as focused on negative rights and autonomy, recent scholarship
demonstrates that classical liberal thought at the time of the founding placed significant
emphasis on human flourishing. Eric R. Claeys, Labor, Exclusion, and Flourishing in Property
Law, 95 N.C. L. REV. 413, 431, 448 (2017).
122. See Treanor, supra note 115, at 826 n.226, 844, 846–47 (arguing Madison
incorporated both liberal and republican thought in drafting the Takings Clause and that the
Takings Clause can be understood “as reflecting the republican idea that in a certain sphere
the state should continue to control the definition of property interests”).
123. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). See generally J. Christopher Jennings,
Madison’s New Audience: The Supreme Court and The Tenth Federalist Visited, 82 B.U. L. REV.
817, 824–25 (2002).
124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 131 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
125. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see also Span, supra note 13, at 70–71.
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interest—oppressing a minority.126 To Madison, the constant,
lingering threat to the republic was not “violent and sudden
usurpations” or “gradual and silent encroachments of those in
power,” but rather the “majority trampling on the rights of the
minority,” turning the republic into a despotism.127
Madison addressed factions through institutional checks,
primarily federalism and representation.128 He rejected the concept
of parchment barriers, which he believed were easily breached by
overbearing majorities.129 The Takings Clause thus, as a matter of
original intent, should not be interpreted merely as a “parchment
barrier,” but rather must be interpreted as an actual institutional
check on factions.130 For the Takings Clause to serve such a purpose,
it must be enforced by an independent judiciary. Yet, for the
judiciary to truly be independent, the judiciary would have to play
a different role than that of the legislature, tasked with determining
which laws were in the public interest.131 To Madison, allowing a
judge to decide which actions were in the public interest would, in
effect, be to allow a judge to also be a party in the case.132
This suggests the Takings Clause was intended to serve as more
of a formalistic boundary over which government could not cross,

126. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see also Span, supra note 13, at 70–71.
127. See James Madison, Debates at the Virginia Convention (June 6, 1788), in 9 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 989, 990 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990). To Madison, where government failed to
protect the weaker against the stronger, “anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a
state of nature.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 358 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961).
128. Span, supra note 13, at 71–74.
129. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison). See generally James S. Liebman &
Brandon L. Garrett, Madisonian Equal Protection, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 938–39 (2004).
130. Span, supra note 13, at 69.
131. Id. at 75.
132. As Madison stated:
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would
certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal,
nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties
at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but
so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single
persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the
different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which
they determine?
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 131–32 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
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as opposed to its protections being extended on an ad hoc basis.133
William Blackstone’s writings, which were highly influential on
Madison, provide further support for such a boundary. Blackstone
stated that, although an individual’s right to property “consists in
the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all of his acquisitions,
without any control or diminution,” those rights were limited
by the “laws of the land.”134 The laws of the land proved to be
a somewhat significant limitation, as detailed in Blackstone’s
writings setting out exceptions to his broad definition of property,
which included the common law of nuisance and other land
use regulations.135
Despite providing for broad regulation of property use,
Blackstone made clear that the laws of the land did not permit the
imposition of a state-dictated use on property—even where in the
public interest. Blackstone wrote that:
So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property,
that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for
the general good of the whole community. If a new road, for
instance, were to be made through the grounds of a private
person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public;
but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this without
consent of the owner of the land. In vain may it be urged, that the
good of the individual ought to yield to that of the community;
for it would be dangerous to allow any private man, or even any
public tribunal, to be the judge of the common good, and to decide
whether it be expedient or no. Besides, the public good is in
nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of
every individual’s private rights, as modelled by the municipal
law. In this, and similar cases the legislature alone can, and indeed
frequently does, interpose, and compel the individual to

133. If the Takings Clause’s protections were only to be extended on an ad hoc basis
based on the strength of the public interest at play, this would mean that a judge was no
longer independent and was acting in the role of legislator. Under such an interpretation, the
Takings Clause would not serve as any real institutional check on the legislature. See Span,
supra note 13, at 69–76.
134. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 134 (Univ. of
Chicago Press 1979) (1765).
135. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Original Understanding of “Property” in the Constitution, 100
MARQ. L. REV. 1, 62, 64 n.335 (2016) (“The practical and political demands of governance,
bolstered by the general historical acceptance of English mercantilism and the theoretical
support of jurists like Blackstone, gave rise to widespread local, albeit shallow, forms of
regulation of property in the public interest.”).
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acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel? Not by
absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary
manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent
for the injury thereby sustained.136

This example by Blackstone, when compared to the use
regulations he theoretically agreed could infringe upon property
rights, demonstrates a distinction between acts of appropriation,
which cannot occur even when believed to be in the public interest
unless the owner is provided with indemnification, and regulations
of use. It also aligns with Madison’s concern over interested parties
judging what constitutes the public good and requiring
indemnification to protect private property.
Further evidence that the Takings Clause applied to statedictated uses of property is demonstrated by St. George Tucker’s
statements in 1803 that the clause was ratified to ensure
compensation when the military took personal property.137
Specifically, he stated that the Takings Clause was “probably
intended to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of obtaining
supplies for the army, and other public uses, by impressment, as
was too frequently practiced during the revolutionary war, without
any compensation whatever.”138 Although this statement does not
speak to regulation directly, it does demonstrate that when
property is put to some form of state-dictated use other than what
was originally intended by the owner, the Takings Clause is
implicated—even if in the public interest.139
B. The Lack of Early Decisions Interpreting the Takings Clause
Prior to the Civil War, few cases addressed the scope of the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause.140 The lack of early Supreme Court
cases addressing takings issues is primarily due to (1) the Court
holding the Takings Clause applied only to the federal government
in the 1833 case of Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore;141 (2) the federal

136. BLACKSTONE, supra note 134, at 135.
137. Treanor, supra note 115, at 835–36; Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 1122–23.
138. Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 1122–23.
139. Id.
140. Kobach, supra note 115, at 1214.
141. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250–51 (1833) (concluding that the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause was only applicable to actions of the federal government).
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government relying upon the states to condemn property needed
for federal purposes until after the Civil War likely because, as
William Baude has argued, the federal government’s power of
eminent domain was understood as only extending to the District
of Columbia and the territories;142 and (3) Congress having the sole
responsibility for paying just compensation for claims against the
federal government until the 1887 passage of the Tucker Act, which
gave the Court of Claims jurisdiction over such claims.143
Some scholars have pointed to evidence of regulations of
economic activity and land use in the late eighteenth century to
demonstrate that the Takings Clause did not extend to regulatory
takings, including physical invasions.144 Early American
regulations showed significant regulation of economic activity and
land use, similar to that at issue in Blackstone’s commentaries.145
Laws regulated prices of food, board, and drink at taverns; required
mills to serve everyone at fixed prices; and also extensively
“regulated ferries, innkeepers, lawyers, leather merchants, [and]
peddlers,” just to name a few.146 Building ordinances, to lower the
risk of fire, required brick or stone for construction and prohibited
straw roofs, wooden chimneys, and the storage of straw or
gunpower.147 Further, at least one example of the taking of the right
to exclude existed, as the antebellum common law recognized that
public accommodations, including innkeepers that held themselves
out to the general public, did not have the right to exclude so long
as capacity existed.148

142. See generally William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE
L.J. 1738 (2013). It was not until the case Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875) that the Court
recognized the federal government as having the power of eminent domain within the states,
recognizing in part that it was implied by the language of the Fifth Amendment.
143. Treanor, supra note 115, at 794 n.69. As Treanor has noted, “even if the early
practice was not to allow judicial resolution of takings claims, it is not clear that this was the
original intent. In introducing the Bill of Rights, for example, Madison indicated that the
rights were judicially enforceable.” Id.
144. Hart, Early Republic Land Use Law, supra note 115, at 1147; Hart, Colonial Land Use
Law, supra note 115, at 1290.
145. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law, supra note 115, at 1290 n.256.
146. Larkin, supra note 135, at 67–68.
147. Id.
148. Joseph Singer argues that such a common law right may have existed for other
businesses as well—not just public accommodations. Joseph William Singer, No Right to
Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1291–93 (1996).
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Nevertheless, the existence of these regulations says very little
about the meaning of the Takings Clause. Such regulations were
implemented by the states—not the federal government, and as
noted, the Takings Clause did not apply to the states. Thus, the
existence of various state land use laws in effect around the time of
ratification has somewhat of a limited bearing on the question of
whether the Fifth Amendment extended to regulatory takings.149
C. States’ Power of Eminent Domain and the Police Power
No doubts existed that each state possessed the power of
eminent domain. And, when the power of eminent domain was
exercised, there was agreement—in theory—that compensation
was due for the property taken.150 The question that arose was what
constituted an exercise of the eminent domain power versus the
police power. Because the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the
states (but many states did have state constitutional provisions that
mirrored the federal Takings Clause), state courts were the ones
grappling with defining this boundary, with federal courts staying
out of the fray.
As noted above, significant state and local land use regulations
existed during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Yet, a
closer examination of these early regulations reveals that they
generally did not involve the transferring of the right to use property
to government or a third party, but rather controlled or restricted
the use put to the property by the owner.151 Where the right to use
property was transferred, an appropriative act, compensation was
generally required, although exceptions existed.152
149. Gold, supra note 115, at 220; Kobach, supra note 115, at 1229.
150. See, e.g., PHILIP NICHOLS, 1 THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN: A TREATISE ON THE
PRINCIPLES WHICH AFFECT THE TAKING OF PROPERTY FOR THE PUBLIC USE 54, 282 (1917)
(recognizing compensation was required for exercises of the eminent domain power).
151. See Hart, Early Republic Land Use Law, supra note 115, at 1131; Hart, Colonial Land
Use Law, supra note 115, at 1253.
152. Hart, in reviewing early land use laws, like some other scholars, has drawn the
broad conclusion that they show that the Takings Clause was not intended to apply to any
regulations (whether causing a physical invasion or an appropriation). See Hart, Early
Republic Land Use Law, supra note 115, at 1131; Hart, Colonial Land Use Law, supra note 115, at
1253. Others, however, have criticized such “absolutist” conclusions and have argued that
the record is decidedly more mixed, such that whether the Takings Clause as originally
understood applies to regulations remains unclear. See Thomas, supra note 115, at 540–41.
Indeed, with respect to two of the three primary examples Hart gives of regulations
involving appropriative acts (as opposed to mere physical invasions regulating an owner’s
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The distinction between (1) appropriations, exercises of the
eminent domain power, which required compensation, and
(2) regulations, exercises of the police power, which did not require
compensation, was recognized by Lemuel Shaw, the Chief Justice
of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Alger.153
The case has been recognized as one of the “most influential and
frequently cited [opinions] in constitutional law[,]”154 as he set forth
a “sophisticated and thoughtful analysis of the regulation of private
property and the difference between the police power and the
power of eminent domain.”155
In Alger, the defendant, the owner of waterfront property, was
indicted after building a wharf that failed to comply with a
regulation limiting how far wharfs could be built into the water.156
The defendant argued that the regulation was unconstitutional, as
it was beyond the state’s police power to enact it.157 Specifically, he
contended that his wharf was not impeding navigation and
therefore was not harming anyone, such that it was beyond the
police power to regulate his wharf.158
Justice Shaw observed that all property rights come, directly or
indirectly, from the state, and therefore an individual’s use of the
land is subject to the state’s regulations of it, pursuant to the police
existing property use), the state required compensation. See, e.g., Hart, Early Republic Land
Use Law, supra note 115, at 1116. Specifically, the mill acts, which “gave riparian owners
desiring to build water-powered mill dams the right to acquire or use private land adjacent
to their own land, for purposes of building the dam or for flooding above the dam,” required
the dam owners to pay adjacent owners compensation or damages. Id. Similarly, some state
legislatures “compel[led] private lands to be used for mining and metal production,” and
“[w]hen land was actually appropriated, to be used for a particular purpose by public
officials or by private persons serving a public function, compensation was always paid.” Id.
at 1119. By contrast, the drainage acts compelled owners of wetlands to participate in
drainage projects without compensation if “neighbors owning a sufficient portion of land
agreed to undertake a drainage project.” Id. at 1117. It should also be noted that early state
laws did permit hunting, fishing, and foraging on private land without permission—unless
land was fenced or otherwise inconsistent with the uses put to the land. See Brian Sawers,
Original Misunderstandings: The Implications of Misreading History in Jones, 31 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 471, 493, 505–10 (2015).
153. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
154. D. BENJAMIN BARROS, ANNA P. HEMINGWAY & SHELLEY CAVALIERI, PROPERTY LAW
872 (2d ed. 2020) (quoting LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF
JUSTICE SHAW 247–48 (1957)).
155. Id.
156. Alger, 61 Mass. at 64; see BARROS ET AL., supra note 154, at 872.
157. See BARROS ET AL., supra note 154, at 872.
158. Alger, 61 Mass. at 65.
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power, which he defined as “the power vested in the legislature
by the constitution, to make . . . all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, . . . as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth.”159
Justice Shaw distinguished the police power from the power of
eminent domain, which was described as “the right of a
government to take and appropriate private property to public use,
whenever the public exigency requires it.”160 Any exercise of the
power of eminent domain—an appropriation for public use—
entitled the owner to compensation.161 He also observed the
difficulties of “mark[ing the] boundaries” of the police power and
“prescrib[ing] limits to its exercise,” observing that “the facts and
circumstances of different cases are so various, that it is often
difficult to decide whether a particular exercise of legislation is
properly attributable to the one or the other of these two
acknowledged powers.”162 Ultimately, the city’s delineation of
harbor lines was an exercise of police power, not of eminent
domain, such that no compensation was required. In so holding,
the court observed that the law did not give the public “occasion to
make the like use, or to make any use of the property, or to take any
benefit or profit to themselves from it.”163 Rather, the law controlled
the use to which the defendant could put to the property, which
involved an exercise of the police power.164
III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S HISTORICAL PROTECTION OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS
The federal courts’ involvement with constitutional protection
of property rights changed drastically after the Civil War due to the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.165 The Fourteenth

159. Id. at 84–85.
160. Id. at 85. Notably, the court noted that mere diminution in value caused by
regulation was not sufficient to give rise to an exercise of the power of eminent domain. Id.
at 86.
161. Id. at 85.
162. Id. at 85–86.
163. Id. at 86.
164. Id. at 85–86.
165. Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public
Purpose in the State Courts, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 329, 381 (Donald Fleming
& Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971).
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Amendment did not expressly include the Takings Clause’s
language providing that private property could only be taken upon
payment of just compensation. It did contain language similar to
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause: that no state may
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”166 The Fourteenth Amendment thus opened the
door to challenges to state actions infringing upon private property
rights.167 As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court began to take on a
“controlling position” with respect to the constitutionality of state
action infringing upon property interests.168 The Court interpreted
the language in the Due Process Clause to prohibit state
governments from “taking private property in the absence of just
compensation.”169 In doing so, it embraced the framework set forth
in Algers, recognizing a distinction between exercises of the police
power, which generally did not require compensation, and the
eminent domain power, which did require compensation to be valid.
A. The Distinction Between Regulations and Appropriations
Recent scholarship has argued that, throughout the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, the Court took a took a flexible
approach to the Takings Clause, considering the public interest at
play in deciding whether compensation was required.170 This
argument, however, relies upon a failure to distinguish between
cases involving appropriations and the eminent domain power
versus regulations and the police power. This argument also
ignores that, in cases involving the eminent domain power,

166. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. But see Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private Property on
the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 187, 196 (2004) (“If a state seeks to deprive an owner of
property, the [Due Process] Clause only guarantees that the state do so by following
preexisting laws and norms of fair adjudication; it does not guarantee any substantive rights
on its own. For such originalists, then, if the Fourteenth Amendment confers any substantive
guarantee against arbitrary property regulations, it is the Privileges or Immunities Clause
that does so.”) (citation omitted).
167. Scheiber, supra note 165, at 381–82.
168. Id. at 382–83.
169. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1892, 1892 n.1 (1992).
170. See Butler, The Governance Function, supra note 14, at 1722–23 (arguing that the
Court historically decided takings cases based on the public and private interests at stake);
Wright, supra note 14, at 361, 366 (discussing how courts in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries gave heavy weight to public interests in their takings analyses).
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compensation was required regardless of the strength of the public
interest at play.171
The famous case of Mugler v. Kansas illustrates the Court’s
recognition of a distinction between regulations enacted under the
police power and exercises of the eminent domain power.172 In
Mugler, a brewer argued that Kansas had taken his brewery in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when it forbid the
manufacture or sale of alcohol.173 The Court rejected his argument,
concluding that Kansas had the right to prevent individuals from
acting in a manner deemed harmful.174 In other words, it could
regulate by restricting the uses of property it found harmful.175 The
Court expressly distinguished its earlier case, Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co., where the Court had held that the permanent flooding of
plaintiff’s property by the defendant’s construction of a dam,
pursuant to state authority, constituted a taking.176 The Mugler
Court found that the action at issue in Pumpelly was the functional
equivalent of a formal exercise of eminent domain, as the property
“was, in effect, required to be devoted to the use of the public, and,
consequently, he was entitled to compensation.”177 Thus, Mugler
fell within the police power because it constituted a regulation (as
it restricted a use) whereas Pumpelly required compensation
because it, in effect, imposed a new use over the property, albeit
one providing a public benefit.178 Notably, the Loretto Court based
the physical takings doctrine on Pumpelly, finding that a physical
171. Although the public interest was considered in evaluating whether an exercise of
the police power was valid, Nichols (and the cases) consistently agree that exercises of the
eminent domain power always required compensation without regard to the public interest
at play, and the Court’s early decisions discussed below bear this out. NICHOLS, supra note
150, at 282.
172. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
173. Id. at 654, 657.
174. Id. at 661–62.
175. Id. at 667–68.
176. Id. (citing Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1872)).
177. Id. at 668.
178. For a case similar to Pumpelly, see Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 327, 328–30 (1922). In Portsmouth, the Court found a taking requiring just
compensation based on a property owner’s claim that the federal government had imposed
a servitude upon his property with an oceanfront resort when the federal army stationed
on an adjacent property shot artillery onto the resort property, effectively using the resort
property as a firing range. Notably, the Court had rejected the owner’s earlier claim that
a taking had occurred solely because the federal army’s facility had negatively impacted
resort business.
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invasion was what was key to the constitutional question.179
However, as Mugler notes, what was key in the Pumpelly decision
was the dedication of the right to use the property to the public.
In John Lewis’s nineteenth century treatise on eminent domain,
he recognized that whether compensation was required turned on
whether the act was an exercise of the police power or the power of
eminent domain. Lewis explained: “Under [the police power],
the public welfare is promoted by regulating and restricting the
use and enjoyment of property by the owner; under the
[eminent domain power], the public welfare is promoted by taking
the property from the owner and appropriating it to some
particular use.”180 Further, “the moment the legislature passes
beyond mere regulation, and attempts to deprive the individual of
his property, or of some substantial interest therein, under pretense
of regulation, then the act becomes one of eminent domain,”
requiring compensation.181
Likewise, Philip Nichols defined the distinction similarly in his
early twentieth century treatise, stating, “In the exercise of eminent
domain property or an easement therein is taken from the owner

179. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982).
180. See JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED
STATES § 6 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1888). Another treatise from this time described the
power of eminent domain as “the power of the sovereign to condemn private property for
public use” and recognized that exercises of this power always required compensation.
HENRY E. MILLS, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas
& Co. 1879). The treatise made clear that the requirement of just compensation was not
“limited to the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public,” but could
extend to encumbrances on property, exclusion of the owner from enjoyment of property, or
injury to the land, as well as the taking of easements. Id. §§ 29–30.
181. LEWIS, supra note 180, §§ 6, 9. The police power, in a broad sense, constituted “the
power of the sovereign to prevent persons under its jurisdiction from conducting themselves
or using their property to the detriment of the general welfare” and, in a more specific sense,
“the power of the sovereign to legislate in behalf of the public health, morals or safety by
general regulations reasonably adapted to the end in view and not creating any arbitrary
discrimination between different classes of men or things.” NICHOLS, supra note 150, § 15.
Notably, the First Edition of American Jurisprudence described the police power’s impact
on property as follows:
[T]he police power, so far as it relates to property, is a power to regulate the use of
property and is negative or inhibitory in its character. A man cannot be compelled
under the police power to devote his property to any particular use, however
advantageous to himself or beneficial to the public, although he may be compelled
to refrain from any use which is detrimental to the public.
People v. Chi. Land Clearance Comm’n, 150 N.E.2d 792, 798 (Ill. 1958) (Klingbiel, J.,
dissenting) (quoting 11 AM. JUR. Constitutional Law § 268 (1936)).
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and applied to public use because the use or enjoyment of such
property or easement therein is beneficial to the public,” whereas
“in the exercise of the police power the owner is denied the
unrestricted use or enjoyment of his property, or his property is
taken from him, because his use or enjoyment of such property is
injurious to the public welfare.”182 Nichols advised that, “[f]or the
sake of accurate thinking[,] . . . it is well to keep in mind the
fundamental distinction between the two powers in their
application to private property.”183
Nichols recognized that where property was taken pursuant to
an exercise of eminent domain, compensation was required.184 As
Nichols explained:
[I]t is universally conceded that when land or other property is
actually taken from the owner and put to use by the public
authorities, the constitutional obligation to make just
compensation arises, however much the use to which the
property is put may enhance the public health, morals or safety.185

Nichols further recognized that compensation could be
required even “without formally divesting the owner of his title to
the property or any interest therein.”186 Nichols urged for
constitutional protection of property to be broadly construed,
arguing that “[c]onstitutional rights rest[] on substance, not on
form, and the liability to pay compensation cannot be evaded by
leaving title in the owner, while depriving him of the beneficial use
of the property.”187
Although a conclusion that an action constituted an exercise
of the eminent domain power meant that the action necessarily
required compensation, the conclusion that an action constituted
an exercise of the police power did not end the inquiry.188
182. NICHOLS, supra note 150, at 54.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 282.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 292.
187. Id.
188. As Karkkainen argues:
[Although] a legitimate exercise of the police power could never give rise to a
compensable taking, . . . that did not mean that states had license to run roughshod
over property rights. Some actions ostensibly taken pursuant to the police power
might not be legitimate exercises of that power. Such actions might be deemed
implied exercises of the state’s complementary power of eminent domain,
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Exercises of the police power were closely scrutinized under the
following traditional substantive due process inquiry:
If . . . the regulation under criticism is not in any way designed to
promote the health, comfort, safety, or welfare of the community,
or that the means employed have no real and substantial relation
to the avowed or ostensible purpose, or that there is wanton or
arbitrary interference with private rights, 189

the regulation exceeded the boundaries of the police power. This
traditional substantive due process inquiry provided significant
constitutional protection of property rights, as any government
action infringing upon property rights that failed this inquiry was
invalidated (unless it could be sustained under another power).190
B. Pre-Mahon Federal Railroad Cases
What constituted an exercise of the eminent domain power (as
opposed to the police power) was not always clear but was fleshed
out in a series of cases involving businesses affected by a public
interest—the classic example being railroads.191 The cases
concerning businesses affected with a public interest are only rarely
addressed in contemporary takings scholarship,192 but they have
important implications with respect to the boundaries of the police
power. Because the railroads’ property was “used in a manner to
make it of public consequence” and “affect[ed] the community at
large,”193 courts found an affirmative obligation existed for
railroads and similar businesses “to be reasonable in dealing with
compensable under established due process principles; or they might lie beyond
any legitimate power of the state, and be held invalid.
Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the
Takings “Muddle”, 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 842 (2006) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
189. See id. at 861 (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548,
559 (1914)); see also Claeys, supra note 89, at 1576–85.
190. Claeys, supra note 89, at 1576–85.
191. Lunney, supra note 169, at 1909–10. Other businesses included those involving “the
production of liquor, the storage of grain, public utilities, fire insurance, and rental
apartments.” Id. at 1916 (citations omitted). By contrast, “theaters and entertainment
facilities, retail gasoline sales, employment agencies, the packing industry, and the ice
business” were not considered to be affected with a public interest. Id. (citations omitted).
192. William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of
Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 817, 836 (1998) (noting that the cases involving businesses affected
with a public interest are “generally overlooked” and “almost totally forgotten”).
193. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877).
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the public,” such that the state could control aspects of the
businesses pursuant to the police power, even though such
regulations were generally invalid as to businesses not affected
with a public interest.194
As the Court observed in Munn v. Illinois, when “one devotes
his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect,
grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be
controlled by the public for the common good.”195 Although he
could “withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use, . . . so long
as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control.”196 Thus,
in a series of cases, the Court upheld heavy regulations of railroads’
rates, concluding that such regulations were constitutional so
long as they did not result in the industries failing to receive a
reasonable return.197
Aside from the limits to rate regulation, the Court recognized
another important limit to regulation of businesses affected with a
public interest. Specifically, the Court recognized that railroads
could only be regulated with respect to those public uses to which
they had devoted their property. Government action that went
beyond regulating existing public uses—that sought effectively to
transfer the right to use to another (an exercise of the eminent
domain power)—was invalid in the absence of compensation.
Thus, in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Central Stock Yards
Co., the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr., concluded, in a cursory manner, that the state had taken
the plaintiff railroad’s private property when the state required the
plaintiff to allow third party railroads to use its switching facilities
and cars without compensation.198 Similarly, in Missouri Pacific
Railway v. Nebraska, another opinion authored by Justice Holmes,
the Court found unconstitutional a statute requiring railroads to
either allow third parties to use the railroads’ property to build
grain elevators or, if the railroads refused, to require the railroads
194. Lunney, supra note 169, at 1915; see also Treanor, supra note 192, at 832–39
(comparing traditional police power cases to businesses affected with a public interest).
195. Munn, 94 U.S. at 126.
196. Id.
197. Treanor, supra note 192, at 837–39, 856.
198. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Cent. Stock Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132, 144 (1909)
(holding, in the absence of a provision “securing due compensation for their use[,]” that a
provision requiring a railroad to permit other railroads to use its cars and switching facilities
was unconstitutional).
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to build tracks to the grain elevators constructed by the third parties
without indemnification.199 The Court acknowledged that states’
broad police powers allowed them to infringe upon property rights
to a limited extent and that railroads could be required to “fulfil[l]
the purposes for which they are chartered and to do what is
reasonably necessary to serve the public in the way in which they
undertake to serve it, without compensation.”200 Yet, although
installation of the side track was reasonable, would not impose any
undue burden on the railroads, and served a public purpose, the
Court recognized that the railroad had undertaken no obligation
with respect to installing side tracks for grain elevators.201 Thus,
upholding the statute would require the railroad to pay for the
private connections of another, as the side tracks would be devoted
to a special use.202 In other words, the grain elevator statute did not
regulate the existing use of the railroad’s property but rather
sought to require it to devote its property to a new use for a third
party—an appropriation.203 Notably, the Court found the
obligation impressed on the railroad went “beyond the limit of the
police power.”204
In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. North Dakota, the Court further
expounded on the limits of regulation under the police power in the
context of addressing a challenge to coal carriage rate regulation:
But, broad as is the power of regulation, the State does not enjoy
the freedom of an owner. The fact that the property is devoted to
a public use on certain terms does not justify the requirement that it
shall be devoted to other public purposes . . . . If it has held itself out
as a carrier of passengers only, it cannot be compelled to carry
freight. As a carrier for hire, it cannot be required to carry persons
or goods gratuitously. The case would not be altered by the
assertion that the public interest demanded such carriage. The
public interest cannot be invoked as a justification for demands
which pass the limits of reasonable protection and seek to impose
upon the carrier and its property burdens that are not incident to
its engagement. . . . [I]n Missouri Pacific Railway v. Nebraska, 217

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
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Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196, 204, 207 (1910).
Id. at 206.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 206.
See id.
Id. at 207.
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U.S. 196, it was held that the carrier could not be required to build
mere private connections, and the adequacy of the receipts from
its entire business did not enter into the question. And this was so
because the obligation was not involved in the carrier’s public
duty and the requirement went beyond the reasonable exercise of
the State’s protective power.205

These cases taken together demonstrate that government action
was unconstitutional in the absence of compensation whenever it
transferred the right to use the railroads’ property to a third party
and the new use had no direct relationship to the uses to which the
railroads had dedicated their property.
C. Pre-Mahon State Cases
State courts similarly recognized the distinction between police
power regulations and exercises of the eminent domain power.
Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that the police power did
not stretch so far as “to sanction the taking of private property for
public use without making just compensation therefor, however
essential this might be, for the time, to the public health, safety,
etc.”206 The court explained:
Under the police power the public welfare is promoted by
regulating and restricting the use of property; under the exercise of
the right of eminent domain the public welfare is promoted by the
actual taking of the property for some particular use. . . . [T]he
State has reserved to itself all the police power necessary and
proper to protect the life and property of the citizen. . . . The
requirement that compensation be made for public use imposes
no restrictions upon the power of the state to make reasonable
regulations to protect life and secure the safety of its people. 207

Relying on the Supreme Court railroad cases discussed above,
the California Supreme Court similarly recognized the distinction
between the two powers in addressing a telephone company’s
claim that requiring it to carry the telephone signals of rival carriers
constituted a taking without just compensation.208 The court
observed that the police power went “merely to the regulation of the
205.
206.
207.
208.

236 U.S. 585, 595–96 (1915) (emphasis added).
City of Belleville v. St. Clair Cnty. Turnpike Co., 84 N.E. 1049, 1053 (Ill. 1908).
Id. at 1053–54 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman, 137 P. 1119, 1127 (Cal. 1913).
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public utility, and that when an order passes beyond proper
regulation it amounts to a taking of the property and the order
is then referable not to the police power but to the power of
eminent domain.”209 The court found that the regulatory power as
to public utilities consisted of “[t]he right to regulate tolls and
charges”; “[t]he right to prevent discrimination upon the part of the
public utility”; and “[t]he right to make orders and to formulate
rules governing the conduct of the public utility, to the end that
its efficiency may be built up and maintained and the public and
its employees be accorded desirable safeguards and
conveniences.”210 The court stressed that “[b]eyond these matters
regulation, as regulation, does not and from the very meaning of
the word cannot go.”211
The California Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
use to be imposed on the telephone company for the benefit of the
competitors was “not a new use, but is a use for which the
telephone company had already dedicated its property to the
public.”212 Instead, the court agreed that the telephone company
had “never dedicated its property to the use of rival and competing
companies,” only to “telephone service conducted by itself for the
benefit of its own patrons.”213 The court concluded that “regulation
of use within the dedicated use is as far as the police power may be
extended, and that when the regulation exceeds this, it is always
void for unreasonableness and may, depending upon the form and
character of the order, be also void as an attempt to take property
without compensation in violation of the constitutional
protection.”214 The court noted that government could, however,
alternatively decide to exercise its eminent domain power and take
the property for a public use provided compensation was paid.215
In a concurrence, Judge Sloss observed that “an order
compelling the owner of a telephone line, or of any other property
adapted only to a particular use, to surrender it, in a greater or less

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
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degree, to such use by others, is clearly a taking of that property.”216
That was the case even where a particular property had been
dedicated to a public use or service, as the owner had only
consented to others using the property “within the limits to which
the dedication extends.”217 Importantly, Judge Sloss observed that
if the company “had held itself out as prepared to make and had
made connections with such rival companies—it would be bound
to treat all alike. An order requiring a connection would in such
case be a mere regulation of the service within the scope of the
professed service.”218 To Judge Sloss, “[t]o be compelled to so
share it is to subject its property to a new use—and thus, in part, to
take it.”219
D. Mahon and the Continuation of the Distinction Between Regulations
and Appropriations
Following the cases discussed above, Justice Holmes drafted
the now infamous Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.220 Mahon
involved a law that restricted a use of property (similar to Mugler),
and thus, in that sense, the law was regulatory (not appropriative)
in nature. Mahon is often recognized as being the first regulatory
takings case,221 but as discussed above, the Court had previously
recognized that rate regulations of the railroad industry that went
too far in terms of their economic impact could be invalidated.222 As
Treanor has argued, the only original aspect of Mahon is that Justice
Holmes recognized that an otherwise permissible regulation of a
business—not affected by the public interest—could nevertheless
go “too far,” such that it ceased to constitute a valid exercise of the
police power and would require an exercise of eminent domain to
sustain it.223
In Mahon, the Court addressed the validity of a state law
prohibiting a coal company from mining under homes where the

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 1142 (Sloss, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1143.
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).
See Treanor, supra note 192, at 837–38.
See id. at 856.
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mining would result in the collapse of the home.224 Prior to the
implementation of the law, the coal company had transferred by
deed the surface of the property in question to the Mahons (who
then built a home on the surface), but reserved the right to remove
all of the coal from below the surface.225
Justice Holmes acknowledged that property rights must in
some cases yield to the police power, but then wrote that, “while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking.”226 He then framed the key
inquiry as to when a state’s exercise of the police power surpasses
constitutional limits as “the extent of the diminution [in property
value]. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain the act.”227 The question of what was “too far” was a
question of degree and not one that could be disposed of by a
general rule.228
Justice Holmes did not focus solely on loss of value in Mahon,
but also observed that requiring a coal company to keep a column
of coal in place had “very nearly the same effect for constitutional
purposes as appropriating or destroying it.”229 Justice Holmes
explained that “a strong public desire to improve the public
condition [was] not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”230
He ultimately concluded that the law at issue went too far, but gave
no further guidance of when a law crossed that line.231 Mahon thus
presented the question—still perplexing the Court and scholars
today—as to how far is too far, such that a law effectively
constitutes an appropriation requiring compensation, despite not
transferring the right to use to another. Although similar to an
appropriation, Mahon did not involve an actual appropriation, as it
did not involve the transfer of use of property to a third party or
the state, nor did it technically impose a new use on property.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
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Following Mahon, the Court was faced with a state action that
did transfer the right to use property to third parties. In Delaware,
Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co. v. Town of Morristown, the Court
found a town ordinance requiring the establishment of a public
hack stand on a railroad station’s grounds constituted a taking
without compensation.232 The Court assumed that the
establishment of the hack stand was in the public interest, but
nevertheless found compensation was still required pursuant to the
Due Process Clause.233 Citing Mahon, the Court observed:
The police power may be and frequently it is exerted to effect a
purpose or consummate an enterprise in the public interest that
requires the taking of private property; but, whatever the purpose
or the means employed to accomplish it, the owner is entitled to
compensation for what is taken from him.234

The Court observed that the railroad had contracted with a private
party to have it exclusively provide taxi services on the property,
but found no duty to “accord to other taxicabmen the use of its
lands simply because it had granted [one entity] privileges” of
entry.235 To uphold the ordinance would hand the property over to
third parties to be used as a public hack stand.236 “Under the guise
of regulation, the town cannot require any part of the driveway to
be used in a service that petitioner is under no duty to furnish.”237
Although the scholarship has dedicated buckets of ink to the
meaning of Mahon, the Court’s railroad cases discussed above have
largely been ignored, perhaps dismissed as involving principles
unique to the category of businesses affected with a public interest.
However, the boundary drawn in those cases—between regulating
existing uses versus transferring the right to use—are equally
applicable to businesses with less of a public calling. If highly
regulated industries, such as railroads, cannot be forced to allow
third parties and government to use their private property for
uses unrelated to the owner’s dedicated use, other businesses

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182, 192–93 (1928).
Id.
Id. at 193 (citing Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416).
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id. at 194–95.
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certainly cannot be required to do so—even if determined to be in
the public interest.
IV. REDEFINING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN REGULATIONS AND
APPROPRIATIONS
As set forth in section I.B, supra, the Court in Cedar Point did
little to clarify the scope of the physical takings doctrine, such that
what physical invasions constitute takings remains unclear. This
not only impacts governments seeking to regulate property
without running afoul of the Constitution, but also further weakens
the constitutional protections afforded by the Takings Clause. A
complete elimination of the distinction between regulations and
appropriations, as frequently urged by scholars, would render the
protections afforded by the Takings Clause largely illusory. The
continued distinction between regulations and appropriations is
necessary to continue to advance the normative goals of autonomy
and liberty, and ultimately, to provide the preconditions for our
continued democracy.
What constitutes an appropriation should be redefined,
however, with history serving as a guide. As the Court’s
nineteenth- and twentieth-century cases demonstrate, the focus
should be on transfers of the right to use property to government
or third parties and the connection between that transfer and the
original use the owner put to the property. Although the standard
would be fact specific and more nuanced, such a standard would
bring more doctrinal and theoretical clarity as to the Takings
Clause’s scope than the Court’s current bright-line approach that
lacks historical support, is riddled by inconsistencies, and is
weakened by a number of vague exceptions.
A. A Way Forward Using History as a Guide
As set forth in Parts II and III, supra, history supports a
boundary between regulation and appropriation in interpreting the
Takings Clause. Relatedly, as the railroad cases demonstrate, what
constitutes an appropriation has not historically turned on factors
such as whether property was open to the public or the physicality
or duration of the invasion, but rather on whether the law transfers
the right to use to another and the relationship between the
government use and the owner’s dedicated use of the property.
854
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This Article thus proposes that whether an appropriation occurred
requiring compensation is determined by examining the
relationship between the government use and the owner’s
dedicated use of the property.
If government action transfers the right to use, and the
government use of the property does not relate in any way to the
owner’s existing use of the property, the action is appropriative and
requires compensation. Under these circumstances, the boundary
between regulation and appropriation is clear. Cases involving
clear acts of appropriation include Pumpelly, involving flooding,238
and United States v. Causby, involving the invasion of a private farm
by the government frequently flying military aircraft low over the
property.239 In both cases, the government actions resulted in a
forced transfer of the right to use the real property from the owner
to the government and the government’s uses of the property were
wholly unconnected to the owners’ ongoing uses of the property,
such that the actions clearly constituted an appropriation.240
As recognized throughout, however, at times, laws can be said
to both transfer the right to use property to a third party or the
government and, at the same time, appear to control the existing
use of the property.241 Both Loretto and Cedar Point fall into this gray
area, as the government actions causing the invasions were related
to the owner’s use of the property. In Loretto, the regulation only
applied to rental properties and benefitted the tenants,242 and in
Cedar Point, the regulation only applied to agricultural employers
and benefitted the employees.243 Loretto and Cedar Point both
concern regulations that purported to control an existing use while
at the same time transferring the right to use to a third party, and
thus, are simply more complex than Pumpelly and Causby. The

238. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 167 (1872).
239. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258 (1946).
240. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 180; Causby, 328 U.S. at 264–65.
241. One early treatise recognized that the distinction between exercises of the police
power and exercise of the power of eminent domain would not always be clear, stating that
“[w]hile the theoretical distinction between the police power and the power of eminent
domain is clear and definite, it is not always easy to distinguish them in their practical
application. That is sometimes attempted under the police power which can only be
accomplished by an exercise of eminent domain.” LEWIS, supra note 180, § 156.
242. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
243. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2069 (2021).
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government actions at issue in Loretto and Cedar Point have both
regulatory and appropriative elements.
This Article thus proposes a fact-specific standard, rather than
any bright-line rule, be used to determine whether government
actions should constitute appropriations necessarily requiring
compensation or constitute regulations subject to Penn Central.
Determination of these cases will involve close scrutiny of the
relationship between (1) the use put to the property by the third
party or the government (the state-dictated use) and (2) the owner’s
dedicated use of the property. If a direct relationship exists, then
the law constitutes a regulation. However, where the relationship
between the government use and the owner’s dedicated use
becomes too attenuated, then the law ceases to constitute a
regulation and instead is an appropriation requiring compensation.
By examining the question of whether a direct relationship exists,
the Court would be examining whether government truly is
regulating or seeking to appropriate property under the guise of
regulation to avoid the payment of compensation. Notably,
government action under this test will often involve a physical
invasion and the taking of the right to exclude, but it is not the fact
of the physical invasion or the taking of the right to exclude that
renders the government action unconstitutional. Similarly, as with
respect to the physical takings doctrine as articulated in Cedar Point,
the size, extent, and duration of the access would not bear on
whether a taking has occurred (as opposed to the amount of
compensation due).
The direct relationship test proposed herein would be largely
consistent with the Court’s existing precedent, which does not
require compensation for certain categories of laws, despite these
laws transferring the right to use property from the owner to a third
party or to the government. First, regulations providing invitees or
licensees (that is, those already on the property with the owner’s
permission for a particular purpose) with the right to engage in a
new use not permitted by the property owner, but directly related
to the existing use, would pose no Fifth Amendment issue. Thus,
laws allowing union organizing and picketing by employees would
continue to survive constitutional scrutiny, as the employees were
already permitted to be on the property for employment purposes
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and union organizing is related to, and arises out of, employment,
such that a direct relationship exists.244
Second, regulations requiring third parties (not invitees or
licensees) with the right to access property for a particular use
where that use is otherwise identical to the existing use of the
property by the owner would also not require compensation to be
upheld. Thus, public accommodation laws would pose no
constitutional issue because they do not change the nature of the
use from public to private and do not change the nature of the
activities ongoing on the property. By contrast, laws like the one at
issue in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, which provided third parties
(not previously permitted access to the property) with the right to
use property and also changed the nature of the use of the property
from private to public,245 would still constitute appropriations
requiring compensation. Similarly, laws like the one at issue in
Loretto and Cedar Point, providing a third party with the right to use
property for a new purpose—not already ongoing on the property
by anyone and not to fulfill any rights of those on the property—
would generally constitute an appropriation.246
Finally, laws that provide a third party with rights derivative of
those already on the property would also pose no constitutional
issue. Thus, as the Court recognized in Babcock and Lechmere,
nonemployee union members can permissibly access an
employer’s private property where necessary to inform employees
of their right to organize (or where their presence is otherwise
necessary to fulfill a right held by the employee).247
Although this proposed test is largely consistent with the
Court’s prior precedent, PruneYard is the exception. The California
constitutional provision at issue in PruneYard, requiring access to
commercial property for solicitation purposes, would constitute an
appropriation requiring compensation. First, PruneYard involved a
new use of the property, as the shopping center’s existing use was
244. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 558, 575–76 (1978).
245. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
246. The approach set forth herein also is consistent with Brown v. Legal Foundation, 538
U.S. 216 (2003), involving a regulated economic relationship between two parties and a rule
requiring giving property to a third party for a new use with no relationship to the original
agreement, such that the rule resulted in an appropriation of the property.
247. See generally NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956) (nonemployee
union members can access private property where their presence is necessary to allow
employees to fulfill their rights under the NLRA).
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commercial activity (and the owner had a no solicitation rule), but
the challenged provision required access to the property for
solicitation.248 Although expanding free speech rights may be a
legitimate government interest and allowing solicitation in
shopping centers like the one at issue in PruneYard may support
that goal, no direct relationship between commercial activity and
free speech exists. In other words, the government cannot be said
to be directly regulating the commercial activity at issue in the mall
when it is requiring access for solicitation purposes.
The impact of allowing government action like that at issue in
PruneYard on the owner’s autonomy is significant and not without
economic cost. As one California court has noted, allowing private
property to be used as
the functional equivalent of a traditional town center inevitably
will impose on its owner the financial and emotional costs of
defending against a lawsuit whenever the owner resorts to time,
place, and manner restrictions to preclude its use for expressive
activity. It takes little imagination to recognize that those
precluded from using the property to advance their views will
accuse the property owner of impermissibly prohibiting the
expressive activity based on the content of the message.249

Although most scholars have rejected outright any distinction
between regulations and appropriations, a few have continued to
argue that the differences between the two are constitutionally
significant. However, in defining what constitutes an appropriation
they generally include any transfer of the right to use property
to government or a third party as an appropriation that would
require compensation even if the transfer directly relates to the use
already being put to the property.250 They thus embrace more of a
248. See Sisk, supra note 60, at 411–12; Alan E. Brownstein & Stephen M. Hankins,
Pruning Pruneyard: Limiting Free Speech Rights Under State Constitutions on the Property of
Private Medical Clinics Providing Abortion Services, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073, 1090 (1991).
249. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Young, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 739 (Ct. App. 2003).
250. See Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 1080, 1114–15 (a taking for public use occurs “only
when government exploits some productive attribute or capacity of private property for
state-mandated service”); see also William P. Barr, Henry Weissmann & John P. Frantz, The
Gild that Is Killing the Lily: How Confusion Over Regulatory Takings Doctrine Is Undermining the
Core Protections of the Takings Clause, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 431, 481 (2005) (arguing that
the core protection provided by the Takings Clause is requiring compensation when the
government “transfers the right to use property from the owner to a third party or to the
government itself” and “confusion has arisen when the Takings Clause is extended to the
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bright-line-rule approach, which fails to allow for exceptions (as the
direct relationship approach does) for public accommodation laws,
workplace accommodation laws, and labor laws relating to
employees (as opposed to nonemployees like in Cedar Point)
engaging in organizing activities on employer’s private property.
The direct relationship approach is thus a more flexible standard
that provides an objective framework for evaluating challenges to
government action that can be said to have both regulatory and
appropriative characteristics.
The direct relationship test proposed herein differs from the test
used in the exactions context as set forth in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard.251 Specifically, the
Court has held that, with respect to land use permits, government
conditions (exactions) that would otherwise constitute takings for
which compensation is due may nevertheless be constitutional
where: (1) an “essential nexus” exists between the legitimate state
interest and the condition exacted by the city; and (2) ”rough
proportionality” exists between the exaction and the impact of the
proposed development.252 The Court has rooted its exactions test in
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, stating that
the government may not require a person to give up a
constitutional right—here the right to receive just compensation
when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a

distinct situation of regulation of the owner’s use of its own property”). One scholar
would equate appropriation with acts “tantamount to an eminent domain action[,]” which
would significantly narrow the scope of the Takings Clause and would be inconsistent with
the Court’s nineteenth- and twentieth-century precedent invalidating government action
that transferred the right to use to third parties despite the government not holding
an expropriatory intent. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper
Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 719
(2002) (arguing that the Takings Clause is violated only where the government acts
with expropriatory intent, meaning the government action is “tantamount to an eminent
domain action”).
251. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
252. Initially, this nexus–rough proportionality standard appeared to apply only to
land use permits conditioned on the owner providing strangers with permanent access to
the owner’s land (implicating the right to exclude). See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827–28; Dolan, 512
U.S. at 379–80. In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, the Court expanded the
circumstances under which the standard applies to where the permit is conditioned on the
payment of money (as opposed to access to land). 570 U.S. 595, 612 (2013).
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discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the
benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.253

The proposal set forth herein concerns whether a taking occurred
in the first instance because the act at issue constitutes an
appropriation. Whether that appropriation is nevertheless
constitutional because it satisfies the exactions test is a separate
question governed by the Court’s precedent in Nollan and Dolan.254
The proposed test would still be in addition to substantive due
process review. A challenge under the Due Process Clause to a
regulation of property is subject only to rational basis review.255
Rational basis review only invalidates a statute where no rational
connection between the law and a legitimate government interest
exists, and “is highly deferential; courts hold statutes
unconstitutional under this standard of review only in rare or
exceptional circumstances.”256 The direct relationship test, rather
than looking at the connection between the law and whether it
advances a legitimate state interest (like health or safety), instead
examines the connection between the owner’s use of land and the
government use to determine whether the government action
constitutes an appropriation under the guise of a regulation.
Relatedly, it should be noted that, throughout the nineteenth
and early twentieth century, challenges to state action infringing
upon private property rights were decided under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause—not the Takings Clause as
incorporated against the states.257 At the time of these cases,
253. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.
254. As noted in sections I.B and I.C, supra, the Cedar Point Court recognized three
broad exceptions to the physical takings doctrine, one of which was the Nollan-Dolan
exception. The Court held that the California access regulation did not fall into the scope of
that exception because “the access regulation is not germane to any benefit provided to
agricultural employers or any risk posed to the public.” Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141
S. Ct. 2063, 2080 (2021). The scope of these exceptions remains unsettled.
255. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542–43 (2005) (noting that “a regulation
that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that
it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause[,]” and recognizing the distinct questions between
whether a regulation violates substantive due process and whether property has been
“taken” such that compensation is due).
256. See Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Kentucky, 641 F.3d 685, 689 (6th Cir.
2011) (citation omitted).
257. Today, the Supreme Court takes the view that the Fifth Amendment was
incorporated against the states in 1897 in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago
(Chicago B&Q). Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978) (citing
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however, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, like the Takings Clause, prohibited state
governments from taking private property in the absence of just
compensation.258 The reasoning employed in these cases—distinct
from the substantive due process inquiry—is thus directly relevant
to contemporary Takings Clause jurisprudence insofar as the
challenged government action involves an appropriation, that is, an
exercise of the eminent domain power.
Finally, although a boundary has long been drawn between
regulation and appropriation, I am not arguing that only
appropriations require compensation. Rather, as pointed out
throughout this Article, historical evidence of courts invalidating
regulations that control or restrict property use (but do not also
impose a new use on property) exists. For example, where
regulation restricts all uses of property or otherwise renders it
valueless, regulation is effectively an appropriation or “mimics”
appropriation, as the Court itself has recognized.259 Whether Penn
Central should continue to exist at all or be reworked is largely
outside the scope of this Article, however. Thus, I do not here
outrightly repudiate the use of Penn Central (or a similar test) as a
fallback standard for evaluating non-appropriative regulations
infringing upon property rights. I do, however, note that where
a non-appropriative regulation is at issue, a basis for treating
state government regulations infringing upon property rights
differently than similar federal government regulations likely
exists.260 This distinction arises, in part, due to the historic deference
Chicago B&Q, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897)). Chicago B&Q, however, says nothing about the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause and instead is a Fourteenth Amendment due process case. See
Karkkainen, supra note 188, at 829, 844. Bradley Karkkainen and others argue that the Court
did not fully incorporate the Takings Clause against the states until Penn Central—in 1978.
See id. at 877–78; see also Treanor, supra note 192, at 832.
258. See Chicago B&Q, 166 U.S. at 241–42; see also Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S.
403, 417 (1896).
259. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992) (“Perhaps . . . total
deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a
physical appropriation.”); see also Span, supra note 13, at 85–86, 90–92. In such a case, I am
inclined to believe compensation should generally be due. Whether that is done by way of a
per se test or through application of the Penn Central test, as well as questions of conceptual
severance, are not questions tackled by this Article.
260. The Court today treats the meaning of the Takings Clause as applicable against
the states as identical to the meaning of the Clause against the federal government. See
Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Regulatory Takings: Why the Fifth Amendment May Not
Protect Against Regulatory Takings, but the Fourteenth Amendment May, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
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given to exercises of the police power that may not be given with
respect to exercises of federal regulatory powers.261 Recognizing
there is a distinction between the limits the Takings Clause poses
on state regulatory action and the limits the Takings Clause poses
on federal regulatory action may go a long way in untangling the
regulatory takings doctrine muddle.
B. Normative Considerations
My arguments in favor of centering the question of
constitutional protection on whether government action constitutes
an appropriation have thus far been historical and somewhat
formalistic in nature. Yet, “[h]istory is ultimately only worth what
we decide it to be.”262 Thus, I seek here to discuss the normative
considerations implicated by the above proposal, which in some
respects returns us to Madison’s original intent in drafting the
Takings Clause. I also seek to account for many of the arguments
raised in progressive property scholarship (which has parallels to
the civic republicans’ arguments of the founding era).
First, although I reject treating takings of the right to exclude as
fundamental,263 I nevertheless seek to account for the values
underlying arguments in favor of protecting this right.264 Protection
729, 743 (2008) (mapping out the argument for incorporation of the Takings Clause under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, such that the Takings Clause as incorporated against
the states would prohibit regulatory takings). As Rappaport has noted:
Concluding that the original meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment does not cover regulatory takings has normally meant the end of the
analysis for commentators who are exploring originalist takings principles. They
then assume or assert that the meaning of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
also applies when the incorporated Takings Clause is applied under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
261. See Karkkainen, supra note 188, at 831–32, 858–59, 907; see also Sterk, supra note 44,
at 206, 222–25, 251–52 (arguing for differing levels of protection depending on whether the
action at issue was taken by the state or federal government as a matter of federalism and
that the Penn Central test should weigh more heavily in favor of compensation when the
federal government took the action as opposed to the state).
262. See Baude, supra note 142, at 1807 (“[H]istory itself will not prove anything
nonhistorical” and “never obviates the necessity of choice.” (quoting H. Jefferson Powell,
Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 662, 691 (1987))).
263. See supra Section I.B.
264. As Claeys has argued, “[p]roperty rights can be strong without being unqualified
rights to exclude,” and “[h]istorically, in Anglo-American law, property has not been
understood as an unqualified right to exclude.” Claeys, supra note 121, at 448. Instead, this
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of the right to exclude serves multiple democratic values, including
autonomy, freedom of association, privacy, and human flourishing.265
An appropriation of property more significantly intrudes upon
these values than mere regulation of the use to which the owner has
freely chosen to dedicate her property.266 An appropriation is not
just state interference with property, but, as the Supreme Court has
recognized, is the taking over of one’s property for a state-dictated
purpose or the impressment of private property into “some form of
public service.”267
right is “better conceived of as a right of exclusive use” and that right is “limited specifically
to reconcile the use-interests that owners and non-owners have in relation to ownable
things.” Id. at 448–49.
265. See id. at 445–46 (“[E]xclusive control expands people’s freedom, their autonomy,
and their capacity to be self-governing agents” and “encourages important republican civic
virtues as well.”); id. at 433–35 (human flourishing is promoted where “government declares
and protects individual rights in the hope and expectation that people will use their rights
to pursue forms of flourishing that they find particularly gratifying”); Henry E. Smith,
Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1693 (2012) (“Desirable features of a
system of property—stability, promotion of investment, autonomy, efficiency, fairness—
relate to the interest in use. There is no interest in exclusion per se. Instead, exclusion
strategies, including the right to exclude, serve the interest in use; by enjoying the right to
exclude . . . an owner can pursue her interest in a wide range of uses . . . .”); id. at 1702
(“[B]ecause it makes sense in modern property systems to delegate to owners a choice from
a range of uses and because protection allows for stability, appropriability, facilitation of
planning and investment, liberty, and autonomy, we typically start with an exclusion
strategy . . . .”) (emphasis omitted).
266. For example, requiring a business owner to allow speech on his property with
which he disagrees may implicate freedom of expression. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 97–98 (1980). Requiring the owner of an abortion clinic to allow
protestors on private property may violate the privacy of the clinic’s patients. See generally
Brownstein & Hankins, supra note 248.
267. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992). As Rubenfeld has argued,
acts of appropriation have a significant impact on private property owners’ autonomy:
When the state puts a person’s things to use, the individual does not merely suffer
economic injury. A servitude is forced upon him. He is made in a small or large
way an instrumentality of the state. This instrumentalization differs from a mere
restraint on liberty, and it differs from a tax. Through the great run of regulations
that govern our lives and through the system of taxation, we all are required to
conform and contribute to public ends. But we are not ordinarily obliged to see
our persons, our lives, or our things taken over, occupied, conscripted into
affirmative state service.
....
. . . [P]rivate property is an embodiment of human will or subjectivity. . . . A
person’s property, precisely by being marked off legally and conventionally as his,
stands as the repository, the emerging reflection, of what ought to be his politically
independent will. When, therefore, the state takes a thing marked off as belonging
to a private person and puts it to use, the state goes beyond mere deprivation. It
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Constitutional protection against appropriations can be viewed
as focused on preventing a political danger—the “danger of
totalitarian state intervention into our lives.”268 An appropriative
act undermines the value of political freedom regardless of whether
the property is residential or commercial in nature.269 Ideals of
democracy and autonomy are, in many ways, in conflict with one
another, but democracy should not trump autonomy, nor should
autonomy trump democracy.270 To allow the former would allow
the majority to oppress the minority, and to allow the latter would
result in the few ruling the many. Further, for citizens to truly
participate in a democracy, they must be autonomous with each
expressing their own, rather than another’s values.271
The above proposal is consistent with the view that “property
rights are not primarily about things, but about people’s relation to
each other as they affect and are affected by things.”272 Taking one’s
things, however, impacts one’s autonomy, and in turn, impacts how
one relates to one another and participates in a democracy.273 Thus,
compromises the independence of his will; it impresses this embodiment of his
independent subjectivity into state service, and to that degree the owner is
instrumentalized as well.
Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 1143–44.
268. See id. at 1142.
269. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) (holding that “simply
denominating a governmental measure as a ‘business regulation’ does not immunize it from
constitutional challenge on the ground that it violates a provision of the Bill of Rights”;
noting the applicability of the First and Fourth Amendments to business premises and
companies; and rejecting relegating the Takings Clause “to the status of a poor relation”); see
also Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 1144–45 (observing “the link between private property—
especially commercial property—and an individual’s political independence has shown
itself too many times throughout history to be ignored,” and “[i]f the state had unrestrained
authority to direct the use of private property, its power to dictate the shape of society and
the course of individual lives would be almost limitless,” creating “the potential for
totalitarian management and functionalization of the citizenry”).
270. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 1, 8–
9 (1993); Treanor, supra note 115, at 821 (discussing the importance of private property, which
provided “the individual with the autonomy that was a prerequisite for full participation in
the polity”).
271. Nedelsky, supra note 270, at 7, 9–10.
272. Id. at 13. This conception of property should be contrasted to the view of property
as only between the owner and the thing, with the owner having a strong right to exclude
nonowners. See Claeys, supra note 121, at 428–29.
273. See Nedelsky, supra note 270, at 21. If the goal is to preserve self-government, then
forcing a few to make sacrifices for the whole undermines that goal. Span, supra note 13, at
62. It both embitters and alienates those citizens from the political process. Id. If they do
participate politically, then their sole motivation is their own self-interest—not the common
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the framework set forth herein recognizes that appropriations
without compensation necessarily will impact not just the
individual’s autonomy, but also that individual’s relationship with
society as a whole. One cannot feel secure or free if her property
can be appropriated at any time without compensation.274 The
Takings Clause thus sets a baseline as to how we as a society must
treat one another in making collective choices.275 When the
government (reflecting the will of the electorate) seeks to
appropriate property—just compensation is required.
The direct relationship framework thus ensures that the
persons whose property was taken—appropriated—are not
alienated from the political process or, worse, reject government
altogether.276 It lowers the tensions, as Madison intended, and in
this sense, serves as an institutional check, protecting the minority
from the political abuses of the majority.277 Ultimately, the purpose
of the Takings Clause today is to play a role in the preservation of
democracy and political freedom, such that decisions about what is
in the public’s interest continue to be made by the whole and not
just the few.278
Although Penn Central may still have a role to play in the
Court’s takings jurisprudence, use of the ad hoc three-factor test
would fail to provide adequate protection against government
appropriations.279 The test, as currently interpreted, requires the
property owner to show the regulation has resulted in significant

good. Id. Ultimately, a government that overreaches—the concern of classical liberals—
undermines the commitment to self-government—the concern of the civic republicans. Id.
Selective self-imposed sacrifices are a “recipe for self-serving factional division.” Id. at 63.
274. Property cannot serve the value of individual autonomy if at any point it can be
pressed into state service for the good of all. See Nedelsky, supra note 270, at 14, 22.
275. Id. at 21.
276. Span, supra note 13, at 62; see Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 1122–23 (summarizing
resentment felt by colonists due to impressment of property into the service of the war
without compensation and how this resentment likely led to the inclusion of the Takings
Clause in the Constitution).
277. See supra Section II.A.
278. See Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 1142–43.
279. Sterk, supra note 44, at 251–52 (“[O]nce the Court applies the balancing test to a
state or local regulation, the result is inevitable: The regulation is sustained.”); see Basil H.
Mattingly, Forum Over Substance: The Empty Ritual of Balancing in Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 695, 699 (2000) (examining outcomes in federal takings
cases and finding a strong presumption in favor of the government applies).
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economic loss or defeated investment-backed expectations.280 Yet,
property theorists have wholly failed to effectively explain why
the size of economic loss is or should be dispositive of whether
a constitutional violation occurs.281 If appropriations are what
are constitutionally prohibited, as this Article argues, then the
better approach is to account for the size of the economic loss
when determining just compensation—rather than accounting
for it when making the all-or-nothing decision as to whether a
taking occurred.
This understanding of constitutional protection of property
does not view as central the Court’s oft-repeated statement that the
Takings Clause was designed to bar “[g]overnment from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”282 It is entirely
unclear when—if ever—just compensation is required under this
standard, such that it is no standard at all. First, to the extent the
statement is interpreted in a purely utilitarian manner to mean that
compensation is not required where the taking would make society
better off as a whole, values such as autonomy and individual
liberty would almost always give way to the desires of the
collective.283 Even setting aside the difficulties of legislatures and
judges correctly deciding what actions truly are utility-maximizing
(and truly benefit the whole), the Takings Clause would be
rendered effectively illusory.284
280. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
281. See Mulvaney, supra note 13, at 933–35.
282. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123–24 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,
49 (1960)).
283. See Sterk, supra note 44, at 251–52; see also Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 1133 (“The
common feature of [constitutional] rights is that they stand against any ordinary cost-benefit
calculus of social welfare. They bind in the teeth of a perfectly plausible state determination
that society would be more efficient, wealthy, or even happy were the guarantee violated.”);
id. (arguing that a constitutional right “is supposed to offer you protection precisely
when a majority correctly determines that it could enrich itself, or make itself happier, at
your expense”).
284. See Span, supra note 13, at 62 (requiring individuals to “mak[e] sacrifices for the
common good” without compensation “would essentially read the Takings Clause out of the
Constitution”); Nicole Stelle Garnett, From a Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v. Wisconsin, 2017
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 131, 148 (2017) (observing importing “public policy considerations into
the definition of private property itself” favors government regulators over property owners
and “transforms the Court’s prior admonition that the Takings Clause exists to prevent the
government from ‘forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole’ into mere hortatory fluff”). There also
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As Jed Rubenfeld has noted, this statement also seems
impossible to reconcile with the numerous redistributive laws
that the Court has recognized as constitutional, including tax
laws (where the government permissibly takes money
disproportionately from one group to pay for numerous public
benefits), rent control laws (which force landlords to bear a
disproportionate burden in providing affordable housing to the
public), and pension laws (which require employers to bear a
disproportionate burden in providing social security for the
elderly).285 Relatedly, like Rubenfeld, I do not think that basing
constitutional protection on a “singling out” principle makes much
sense.286 For example, if all homes located near rivers in a particular
state were appropriated to be replaced with parks, the generality of
the law (applying to all homes near rivers) would, in no way,
excuse the constitutional injury.287 Finally, to the extent this
statement is interpreted to mean that compensation should only be
required when the public interest at play is weak (or conversely that
compensation is not required where the public interest at play is
strong), the Takings Clause is rendered duplicative of the
substantive due process inquiry, which already invalidates
regulations that are arbitrary and capricious.
Under my proposal, any action that transfers the right to
use property to a third party or government and that results in a
state-dictated use unrelated to the owner’s existing use of the
property would be an appropriation (like the solicitation provision
at issue in PruneYard). Yet, where there is a direct relationship
between the appropriative action and the owner’s existing use of
the property, the question of whether the action is regulatory in
nature arises, and therefore the more nuanced inquiry set forth
herein is necessary.
is a moral component to the argument against requiring individuals to make sacrifices for
the whole. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1849, 1882 (2007) (discussing that the opposition to taking property where it benefits
society as a whole “rests on basic moral intuitions,” as it seems punitive, despite the
individual property owner having engaged in no wrongdoing).
285. Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 1136–37; see Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs.
Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1337–38 (1987)
(observing “the obvious disinclination of courts today to act against patently redistributive
legislative interventions”).
286. Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 1138.
287. Id.
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All of this is not to say, however, that concerns of fairness
and justness have no place in the analysis. I recognize and seek
to account for the arguments made by many progressive
property theorists regarding the allocative nature of property.288
Property rights are fundamentally different than constitutional
rights such as free speech, freedom of association, freedom of
religion, and equal protection.289 These constitutional rights can be
classified as “public goods,” meaning that the consumption of these
goods does not lessen the ability of others to consume them.290
Property rights, by contrast, are limited resources and not easily
shareable, as when government allocates one party a property right
that right is denied to others.291 Moreover, how society decides to
allocate property changes over time, giving rise to changing
perceptions of what constitutes a property right.292
Yet, the constitutional protection for property rights in no way
needs to bar allocative adjustments from being made—it just
requires compensation for those on the losing side. Further,
concerns of fairness and justness should not be omitted from the
Takings Clause inquiry altogether, but rather can be considered in
determining what constitutes “just compensation.”293 This is not
only consistent with the text of the Takings Clause, but also avoids
issues with line drawing as to whether only appropriations causing
significant economic loss, impacting one’s personhood (such as by
taking personal, rather than fungible property), or involving whole
parcels of land are compensable. It results in the Takings Clause
question being less of an all-or-nothing proposition and allows for
more nuanced, normative concerns to play a role.294 Although some
288. See supra Section I.C; see also Mulvaney, supra note 13, at 941 (“In light of property’s
allocative nature, asking someone to comply with generally-applicable laws designed to
promote the public interest through reallocating the benefits and burdens of property
ownership ordinarily should not require compensation.”).
289. Mulvaney, supra note 13, at 922–23.
290. Id. at 922.
291. Id. at 923.
292. Id. at 926–27, 937–41; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1065, 1069 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The human condition is one of constant learning and evolution—
both moral and practical[,]” such that property rights are “elastic” in nature.).
293. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
294. As noted throughout, Loretto is much maligned for how the Court accorded
constitutional protection to Loretto despite the economic impact being minimal. Yet, on
remand, Loretto obtained only nominal damages of one dollar, thus accounting for this
economic reality. See Singer, supra note 50, at 643.
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scholars have already delved into this topic,295 more focus should
be devoted to this question in the future.296
Ultimately, and as others have recognized, the arguments of
today regarding constitutional protection of property rights can be
seen as a rehashing of the arguments underlying civic
republicanism and classical liberalism.297 Property rights have long
been treated differently than other constitutional rights. Property
rights are not inviolable: the government can appropriate property
to accomplish objectives in the public interest so long as
compensation is paid. Constitutional protection for property rights
today reflects the compromise that underlies our Constitution: that
“we are both popularly self-governing and yet not under
democratic tyranny.”298 Moving forward, it may be time for courts
and scholars to move past the question of when compensation
should be paid and turn attention to the generally neglected
295. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677 (2005); Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just
Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 239 (2007).
296. The question of how much compensation California must pay remains unclear
following Cedar Point, and whether injunctive relief is available (and the circumstances under
which it is available for a Takings Clause violation) remains unclear. With respect to the
California access regulation, there is no doubt that this type of access will become more
expensive than it currently is—free—but the level of expense will determine how
functionally impermissible similar regulations are. See Benjamin Sachs, A Small Point About
Cedar Point, ONLABOR (June 23, 2021), https://onlabor.org/a-small-point-about-cedarpoint/. Notably, after the Court required compensation for the installation of a cable cord in
Loretto, the amount of just compensation was assessed at one dollar. Relatedly, the plaintiffs
in Cedar Point did not allege any damages.
297. See William Michael Treanor, Translation Without Fidelity: A Response to Richard
Epstein’s Fidelity Without Translation, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 177, 181 (1997) (noting that the Takings
Clause reflects a balancing of the views of republicanism “in which property is held subject
to the demands of the common good as those demands are established by majoritarian
decisionmakers” and liberalism, as it attempted “to give majoritarian decisionmakers
freedom where their decisionmaking was most worthy of deference and to restrain them
where their decisionmaking was most suspect”); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why
the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 593–95 (1984) (observing the
arguments of civic republicanism and classical liberalism continue in the scholarship today,
resulting in “continuing tension in the American property tradition”).
298. See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1628 (1988).
Michelman ultimately argues that the price of recognizing this understanding requires “the
high formality of a few, simple, abstract rules; and the price of such high formality, in a
dynamic and impacted world, is obtuseness.” Id. The approach set forth herein seeks to avoid
being obtuse by recognizing flexibility through the relationship standard as to when
government action constitutes an appropriation versus a regulation. It also seeks to account
for various considerations relating to the fairness of appropriating property in the process of
determining the measure of compensation due.
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questions of whether constitutional protection of property rights
against federal regulatory action is more expansive than protection
against state regulatory action and the circumstances under which
compensation is just.
CONCLUSION
The boundary between appropriation and regulation was
obscured by Loretto and has been criticized in subsequent
scholarship arguing for ad hoc balancing tests focused on fairness
and justness to apply even to direct appropriations. The Cedar Point
Court, by doubling down on the physical takings doctrine without
attempting to explain the many inconsistencies in the doctrine,
ultimately may have weakened the Takings Clause’s protections,
contrary to the majority’s stated goal of seeking to strengthen the
protection of private property rights. This Article recognizes the
historical distinction between appropriations and regulations but
argues that it must be redefined to recognize that what transforms
government action into an appropriation is not a physical invasion,
but rather the transfer of the right to use property to a third party
or government itself without a direct connection to the owner’s
selected use of the property.
Which side of the boundary a law falls on will not always be
clear under the approach proposed herein. However, it avoids
reducing whether just compensation is due to an ever-evolving and
often subjective target as to whether an appropriation is in the
public interest or is otherwise fair and just. It also is consistent with
a historical understanding of the Takings Clause and serves as a
check on governmental power while at the same time not unduly
restricting government from being able to regulate.
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